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Forensic Psychology 
Eric David Kunkel 
George Fox College 
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Abstract 
The prevalence of crime is a world-wide problem, 
and concomitantly, the fear of crime grips the public. 
Also, social scientists remain pessimistic about 
solutions: many acquiesce in the •nothing works" 
conclusion. T~e general populace views crime as both 
pathological (i.e., sick) and evil. Privately, social 
scientists may agree, but professionally they describe 
crime as nothing but an illness. This research 
establishes that such reductionism limits the 
explanatory power of forensic psychology and that 
ruling out the existence of evil a priori is 
unscientific. First, the philosophy of science 
underlying the study of crime is examined. The history 
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of science, the current realist versus antirealist 
debate, the nature of scientific methods, and the 
necessity of herrr.eneutics are reviewed. Charles 
Darwin's Baconian methodology (i.e., consulting both 
general and special revelation) will be adopted. Then, 
the scientific character of theological constructs 
(e.g., evil) and the religious a priori of all 
theoretical thought are examined. Exa..~ining crime and 
evil concurrently actually safeguards science from 
dogmatism, while scie~tism is a self-refuting enemy of 
true science. S:cond, crirni~ological psychology is 
investigated in the context of human nature in general. 
Criminality is shown to be a quasi-psychological 
construct, and Hippocratic and Aristotelian causality 
is reviewed. Several psychological views of crime 
(e.g., Cleckley's psychopathy, the Cognitive-Behavioral 
approach, the Neopsychoanalytic view, and ~he 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual's [DSM) Antisocial 
Personality diagnosis) are analyzed alongside the 
construct of human evil as developed in theological 
anthropology. Third, psychological treatment of 
offenders is exa..~ined. Only when evil is recognized 
does criminal responRibility make sense. The common-
sense attribution that severe criminality is both evil 
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and psychopathological is affirmed. Further research 
in criminal moral development, abnormal psychology, and 
responsibility-grounded psychotherapy is suggested. 
Some possible public policy implications (e.g., 
restitution-based corrections) are discussed. 
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The Study of Crime 
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Divergent opinions abound about crime, its rate, 
its causes, and its solutions (Lewis, 1980). Latent 
notions emerge when a heinous crime occurs in society, 
such as the assassina.t.ion of a president or the 
ccc'.!rrence cf se;;ial hor:Uc:.d..:! (Dobson, 19 69) . 
Yet, people have un.clear and contradictory ideas 
about crime (Wilsen & Herrnstein, 1985). People fuse 
scientific and moral attributions about the causes and 
the cures of criminality (Harvey & Weary, 1985; Heider, 
1958; Katz, 1988). Both the citizenry and the 
professional conununity adopt a mixed vocabulary when 
seeking to describe a criminal act: the same crime is 
seen as illegal, sick, and evil. 
While philosophers, psychiatrists, sociologists, 
theologians, and criminologists all offer opinions 
about crime and criminals, Eysenck (1977) argued that 
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psychologists are the professionals with the greatest 
potential contribution to make in understanding the 
causes and cures of criminality. "No system of 
criminology has any meaning that disregards the central 
feature of all criminology: the individual person we 
are trying to influencen (Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989, 
p. 8). Professional psychologists are uniquely suited 
to investigate the perplexing problem of crime. 
Forensic Psvchologv 
Psychologists who serve in criminal or penal 
settings have a profound responsibility to benefit the 
client/patient and society. They are subpoenaed to 
offer expert testimony about crime and criminals 
(Kaplan & Sadock, 1988; Stone, 1988). They research 
the mental disorders afflicting criminals and are 
mandated by statute to develop treatment plans to 
ameliorate their criminality (Deering's California 
Penal Code, 1985) . Forensic clinicians and researchers 
write opinions that have far-reaching ramifications. 
The safety of society may be at issue. So may the 
disposition of a patient's criminal case: he/she may 
receive life in prison, be committed to an institution 
or be given the death penalty. If inmates are found 
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guilty and treatment is adjudicated, then they have the 
right to effective treatment {American Psychological 
Association [APA], 1974, 1981). Therefore, the 
standards of psychological practice and the existence 
of the offender population behoove the forensic 
psychologist to develop effective treatment modalities 
based on sound, scientific theories. 
The Problem 
Scientism'3 Discor;ion gf Sciencg 
For psychologists to study and treat criminals in 
a professional, echical, and scholarly manner, they 
must take all of the psychological da.ta into account. 
Sound, parsimonious theories that fully explain crime 
and human nature should be the goal of psychological 
theory-building {Miller, 1989). 
However, ~4ny criminal psychologies omit 
humankind's free moral agency from the scope of 
scientific inquiry {Menninger, 1973; Peck, 1983). 
Also, radical reductionism, naturalism, and positivism 
have removed the idea of evil {and value-judgrr.ent in 
general) from psychology's domain {Berger, 1969; 
Bergin, 1987; Schuster, 1987). 
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Psychology, in an atte.'T,;)t to justify its 
scientific status, has adopted scientism instead 
(Moreland, 1989). Scientism is an inflated view of 
science in which knowledge in general is equated with 
modern scientific practice. Those holding this view 
also do little to define science or to place it in its 
historical context (Flew, 1979). 
Scientism is a rather unsophisticated view, but it 
is pervasive in our culture due to the indisputable 
advances of science and technology. In short, 
scientisml is the view that "science has all the 
answers"; it is fundamentally a religious position and 
a dogmatic one at that (Morris, 1984) . 
E:yil as Scientific Data 
The experience of human evil is a real part of the 
human ccndition. Evil may be difficult to investigate, 
but prete~ding a phenomenon does not exist can never 
advance the cause of science. Staub called evil "part 
of a broadly shared human cultural heritage• (1989, p. 
25). He found it necessary to invoke the concept of 
l •scientism• and other technical terms are defined briefly in 
Appendix A. 
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evil in order to explain genocidal behavior. Fromm 
(1973), White (1961), and Peck (1983) have also thought 
that evil was well within the purview of psychological 
study. Psychology itself is defiLed and redefined in 
virtually every new textbook. Furthermore, th.e 
definition of psychology and its scope is not even a 
psychological question: it is a metaphysical question 
and can only be answered by the philosophy of science 
(James, 1890/1990; Pannenberg, 1973/1976). 
Dooyeweerd (1960/1980), the eminent Reformed 
philosopher, noted chat all of creation is open to 
systematic investigation. Therefore, the data of human 
evil is open to scientific inquiry. Why? Because it 
is the:-e. 
Also, to dictate that a particular phenomenon is 
outside the boundaries of a science a priori is unwise 
(Moreland, 1989). For example, a given phenomenon 
(e.g., achievement, religiosity, or crime) is often 
fruitfully investigated by sociology, social 
psychology, and clinical psychology. 
Moving from the general to the particular reveals 
a problem, first in science, then in psychology, and 
specifically in forensic psychology today. Scientists 
have adopted scientisrn as their creed. Because of 
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this, they have neglected the obvious: the existence 
of human evil as a fundamental determinant of crime. 
The Theory 
Rebuilding Forensic Psychology 
White (1987) followed Willia.~ James (1890/1990) 
and argued that the soul (psyche) needs to be put back 
into psychology.2 Others argue for a psychology 
reconstructed along these same lines (Carter & 
Narramore, 1979; Cosgrove & Mallory, 1977). 
A forensic psychology that is reconstructed to 
include the entire data set of human experience should 
theoretically be more inclusive and be better able to 
explain deviant human behavior (Bellah, 1991; Hall, 
1945). This study will contribute to that 
reconstruction by proposing the theory that crime and 
evil can and should be examined concurrently in order 
to establish an adequate foundation for forensic 
psychology. 
2 Etymologically speaking, ~ology minus the ~ is the 
study of nothing. 
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Corollaries to the Theory 
The theory that crime and evil should be examined 
concurrently will be postulated with three corollaries. 
The exposition of these corollaries and the evaluation 
of them in light of any data ge:nnane to forensic 
psychology will constitute the remainder of this study. 
The three subsequent sections of this dissertation will 
apply the crime and evil construct to these levels cf 
analysis: meta-theory, theory proper, and praxis {see 
Table 1). Crime and evil theory and its three 
corollary theories will be held te~tatively until the 
end of the inquiry. 
Table 1 
Tb.Lee Levels of Theoretical A-.11alysis Critiqued with 




Theory about theory. 
Theory proper. 
Theory applied. 
First, the crime and evil postulate will be tested 
against the philosophy of science (meta-theory). Then 
it will be evaluated alongside the current 
psychological views of criminality {theory). Last, the 
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crime and evil model will be tested in the context of 
current psychologically-based criminal interventions 
(praxis) (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
Crime and Eyil Iheor:y and its Corollaries 
The Theory 
Crime and evil should be examined concurrently in order 
to establish an adequate foundation for forensic 
psychology. 
The Corollaries 
l. Ihe Meta-theoretical Level. 
Crime and evil should be investigated together in 
order to establish the philosophy of science 
underlying forensic psychology. 
2. The Theoretical Level. 
Crime and evil should be investigated together in 
order to understand criminal human nature. 
3. The Practical Level. 
Crime and evil should be investigated together in 
order to provide effective clinical treatment for 
criminals. 
Methodoloaical Tasks 
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More specifically, the following three goal 
statements parallel the three levels of inquiry above: 
Invi:stioaticn from a Meta-Theoretical Persnective 
The foundational contribution of t~e philosophy of 
science to the proble..~ of crime and evil will be 
examined. Definitions of science, the distinction 
between theory and meta-theory, the human science 
approach, the interpretation of data, and the problem 
of meaning will be discussed (Moreland, 1989; 
Pannenberg, 1973/1976; Polkinghorne, 1991; Van Leeuwen, 
1985). Overall, the ~ajar question investigated will 
i::>e whether evil ca.n be i.n·;e::itiga::.ed scientifically and 
whether a comprehensive crime and evil \:heo:cy helps or 
hinders in establishing the foundation of forensic 
psychology. Also, the possibility of integrating 
psychology and theology will be broached. The view of 
science developed in the first section will provide the 
structure for the rest of the inquiry. 
Investigation from a Theoretical Persnective 
The use of medico-legal (crime) and moral (evil} 
attributions in criminologic descriptions will be 
explored. The terms psychopathy and antisocial 
personality will be examined. The status of DSM 
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criteria will be reviewed. Also, underlying 
assumptions in current personological theory will be 
discussed (Cleckley, 1976; Eysenck, 1986; Millon, 1986; 
Widiger, Frances, Pincus, Davis, & First, 1991). 
Concurrent with these inquiries, the quasi-
psychological nature of criminality and the idea of 
criminal causality will be introduced. Then 
psychological explanations of crime (Hare, 1970; Meloy, 
1988; Samenow, 1984; Walters, 1990) and theological 
explanations of evil (Erickson, 1985; Saucy, 1993) will 
be considered. 
Investigation from a Ptactical Perspective 
The ramifications that one's theory of crime and 
evil (i.e., attributions) has on the treatment and 
amelioration of criminality will be investigated. The 
issues of punishment, rehabilitation, and restoration 
will be explored. The difficulties and discouragements 
that come with treating severe criminals will be 
examined. Also, the importance of a sense of 
responsibility and adequate moral development in 
inmate/patients will be discussed (Colson & Van Ness, 
1989; Fingarette, 1988; Kohlberg, 1981; Meloy, 1992; 
Umbreit, 1985). 
Limits of the Study 
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This research is not intended to replace textbooks 
in forensic or abnormal psychology, the philosophy of 
science, or forensic treatment. 9ecause of the breadth 
of this undertaking, the completed inquiry will take 
the form of a prolegomenon or introduction. III'!Il'anuel 
Kant wrote that prolegomena 
are designed for preparatory exercises; they are 
intended rather to point out what we have to do in 
order if possible to actualise a science, than to 
propound it. They must therefore rest upon 
something already kno;..n as trustworthy, from which 
we can set out with confidence, aud ascend to 
sources as yet ur.}:nown. (1969, p. 313) 
This research will seek to integrate the extant 
scientific knowledge concerning crime and evil in order 
to provide a needed preface to forensic psychology. 
CHAPTER 2 
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META-THEORY: FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF 
SCIENCE 
Psychology in Context 
Chapter l of this inquiry asserted the necessity 
of considering the construct of evil alongside any 
investigation into criminality. At first glance, given 
the current intellectual milieu, this may seem like an 
apples and oranges comparison. 
This chapter will describe and characterize the 
current state of psychological science. It will show 
that the consideration of a construct like evil 
enriches science. The fact that some current views of 
science that ignore such constructs reduce science to a 
mere caricature of itself will be shown. 
Psychology in the Universe of the Sciences 
Irwin Schrodinger, the great physicist, wrote 
several books about science in general, but he felt 
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uneasy about these projects. An unwritten law in 
science is that 
a scientist is supposed to have a complete and 
thorough knowledge, at first hand, of some 
subjects and, therefore, is usually expected not 
to write on any topic of which he is not a master. 
This is regarded as a matter of noblesse oblige. 
(Schrodinger, 1944/1990, p. 467) 
Yet he did explore the wider field of science in 
general because he believed in cross-disciplinar~ 
studies. However, Schrcdinger believed that no 
scientist really understood her own discipline unless 
she could understar-d it in the ccntex~ of other modes 
of study. He recounted hew the word •university" 
denotes a universal course of study and opined t:iat 
such a universal context was necessary for any true 
learning to take place. Likewise, this inquiry will 
attempt to place criminological or forensic psychology 
in its universal context as a science. 
Psychology and the Nature of Science 
Modern psychological science was born slightly 
more than one hundred years ago with the founding of 
empirical psychology both in the United States and in 
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Gennany. The liberation of psychology from philosophy 
marked its birth (Boring, 1957). Interestingly, Evans 
(1989) believed that many psychologists want to deny 
their philosophical birthright. He noted that 
"disputes in psychology are invariably philosophical in 
character, though psychologists themselves have a 
penchant for calling philosophical disagreements 
•methodological'" (p. 24). 
The Presuppositions of Modern Science 
Sigmund Freud was more frank when he set forth his 
meta-psychological presuppositions: •our best hope for 
the future is that the intellect--the scientific 
spirit, reason--should in time establish a dictatorship 
over the human mind" (1939/1990, p. 880). 
The nineteenth century was dominated by an 
optimistic zeitgeist. Science was believed to be well 
on its way to solving all of life's problems. Leading 
physicists claimed that the world was basically 
understood; their work was finished.3 
3 Einstein's equations confounded this claim (1916/1990). 
However, this has not dampened the scientific optimism of many, 
even until today. 
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Over and against the dictatorship of reason that 
Freud proposed, twentieth-century thinkers have 
examined the limits of science. Kuhn (1970) challenged 
the scientific community to examine the way science is 
done. Studies in the philosophy of science have 
abounded recently (Laudan, 1990) . This spirit of 
scrutiny has not trickled down to all scientists, 
however. Many investigators seem to proceed with 
Freud's agenda. 
Basic science researchers, practitioners, and 
laypersons genera~ly share a ccmmon ignorance of what 
science is and how it is done. Moreland, recounting 
the narrow scope of his own scientific training and 
scientific training in general, recalled: 
Serious study in the history and philosophy of 
science was singularly absent from most science 
curricula. The scientist is trained in first-
order practi es of : udying amoebas, quarks, and 
the like. He is not trained in the second-order 
practice of studying science as a discipline. 
(1989, p. 57) 
Kuhn was one of the first to emphasize that 
philosophy of science must fit the actual history of 
science and the practice of scientists. However, given 
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the explosion of literature in the philosophy of 
science, the public perception and the popular 
preser.tation of science is inexplicable. 
Limitless, om.;ipotent science is treated with the 
reverence that the ancients accorded to the gods. For 
example, C. S. Lewis once described someone he knew who 
gave little thought to her own mortality because she 
confidently believed that science would soon solve the 
problem of death (1978). He noted that the word 
science carries an honorific connotation. Lewis, with 
tongue in cheek, coined the term neophilia to describe 
the current fascination with the latest technology and 
the newest ideas. 
Neophiliacs aside, science does have a context and 
a history. Understanding the place of science is 
essential for psychologists and for all practitioners 
of science in order to best use and to avoid the abuse 
of science (APA, 1981). 
A Brief History of the Physical and Human Sciences 
The ancient Greeks are the earliest known 
systematic scientists.4 Aristotle broke with his 
4 For a discussion of pre-Socratic science, see Clark (1957). 
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mentor, Plato, and instead of being concerned primarily 
with metaphysical ideas, began to study this-worldly 
phenomena (Durant, 1961). The Aristotelian approach to 
science dominated until the rise of English empiricism 
(e.g., Roger and Francis Bacon) (Burtt, 1939). The 
tenn science is derived from the Latin scientia, which 
means "knowledge• (see Table 3). From antiquity, 
science meant any orderly pursuit of knowledge. 
Table 3 
Dualistic Divisions of the Sciences 
~:rd" Si;;iences "SQfJ;;" Sci~I).f,;j2S Theorist 
Phvsical Sciences !Human Science 
Episteme Soohia Jl..ris cot 1 e I 
Scientia Sapientia Auqustine 
Substantia Coroorea Subs tan ti a Coqitans Descartes 
Science Phvsiaues Science Morale J. s. Mill 
NaturNissenschaft Geistwissenschaft Dilthev 
Naturwissenschaft Kulturwissenschaft (Windelband 
Idioqraohic Nomothetic and Rickert) 
Aristotle (1990al, in the Nichomachean Ethics, 
~akes a distinction between two kinds of knowledge, 
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episteme and sophia. However, Augustine's Latin 
terminology solidified the divide between what is now 
called the hard and soft or physical and human sciences 
(Pannenberg, 1973/1976). Augustine continued to use 
the term scientia but added the expression sapientia 
(wisdom) to describe theology and philosophy.S 
Divisions of Science 
Pannenberg (1973/1976) believed that modern 
philosophers of science were influenced by Descartes• 
dualism. Descartes had no fully developed philosophy 
of science of his own. He did, however, provide the 
dichotomous categories that influenced the philosophy 
of science, especially through the last century. 
Descartes believed that there are two kinds of 
substance: mental (substantia cogitans) and physical 
(substantia corporea) (1644/1990). After Descartes, 
both the mental and the physical were considered 
equally real.6 Radical dualism behooved subsequent 
5 The social sciences were subsumed under philosophy. 
6 Later English empiricism and German idealism were largely 
reactions to Cartesian dualism (Durant, 1961). 
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In 1843 John Stuart Mill pu.~lished his Looic. In 
er.apter 6, he distinguished between the natural or 
physical sciences and what he termed the moral 
sciences. For Mill, the moral sciences included 
empirical psychology, history, th~ science of society, 
and what he called ethology.7 
So, his use of the term moral was broader than 
common English usage. The derivation of moral in 
Mill's work is likely from the French phrase sciences 
morales, which was in use at that time and carried the 
wider connotation (Alibert, 1806). 
The German translation of Mill's work rendered 
moral sciences as Geisteswissenschaften, or sciences of 
mind. This terminology was no doubt chosen due to the 
influence of German idealism, especially Hegel 
{l82l/l990l, who used Geistwissenschaft to describe his 
philosophy of mind. The English "human sciences•S is a 
translation of Geisteswissenschaften, for example, in 
7 This was an ethical psychology, not Lorenz's ethology. 
8 Likely a compound from the Latin hµmanitas (the humanities) and 
scientia (Cicero, 1986) . 
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Wilhelm Dilthey•s Introduction to the Human Sciences 
(1989). 
The South-West German School of thought vigorously 
rejected the term Geist:wissenschaft perhaps because of 
its Hegelian connotations (Rickert, 1986; Windelband, 
1901/1935). They preferred the term 
Kulturwissenschaft, but the difference in approach to 
the human and physical sciences is far more than an 
arcane study of foreign etymologies. Rickert and 
Windelband on the one hand and Dilthey on the other 
disagreed on something much more basic. 
The Idiographic and the Nomothetic 
Aristotle, Augustine, Mill, and Dilthey classified 
the sciences based on subject matter. Some sciences 
were •hard" sciences; other sciences were "soft." 
Pannenberg writes: 
Originally the classification of the sciences 
according to the Cartesian dualism of nature and 
mind was based on the assumption of a fundamental 
difference in kind between the objects described 
by these terms, and upholders of it reasoned from 
this assumption to the necessity of a 
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corresponding difference in the methods used in 
their scientific study. (1973/1976, p. 116) 
Windelband, and Rickert after him, distinguished 
the sciences based on their respective methods, not on 
the objects of study. This is still a controversy in 
the human science/physical science debate (Oakes, 
1988). 
Windelband and Rickert contrasted the 
individualizing (idiographic} approach of the human 
sciences with the generalizing (nornothetic) approach of 
the natural sciences (Rickert, 1986). 
Rickert critiqued Dilthey's inclusion of 
psychology as a hu.'l\an science. The establishment of 
the psychological laboratories of Wundt, James, and 
others had demonstrated that psychology was not 
Geist:wissenschaft only. 
Rickert's distinction between idiographic and 
nornothetic procedures was not meant to draw hard and 
fast lines. Idiographic approaches are used in the 
natural sciences as well. Pannenberg agreed and noted 
several specific "hard science• uses of idiographic 
methods. In these cases, truly individual causes 
produce unique effects (see Table 4) (Pannenberg, 
1973/1976) . 
Table 4 
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The Use of Individualizing !Idiograohicl Methods in the 
Natural Sciences 
The Study of Malformations in Embryology. 
The Meteorology of Low Pressure Systems. 
The Study of Cosmology. 
The Cevelopment of Natural Landscapes. 
The Study of Heredity. 
The hunian sciences use nomothetic methods as well. 
The human sciences and even the humanities strive for 
nomological certainty by using e..~pirical methods. 
Computer studies of vocabulary in literary texts is one 
example (Friberg & Friberg, 1981). 
Psychology is obviously one discipline where 
idiographic (the case study) and nomothetic (the search 
for psychological laws) approaches are both used. 
Divergent schools of psychology use case studies to 
verify their nomothetic theories; each has its own 
little Hans or Albert. 
Science; Multiple Descriptors of a Single Reality 
The various sciences describe one reality. 
Dividing science up dualistically into hard and fast 
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categories {like human versus natural sciences) or 
reifying the approved method of inquiry {the 
idiographic versus the nomocheticl does sciencif ic 
inquiry a disservice. 
Scientific Description of Reality 
Psychologists and other scientists have an image 
of their disciplines. Currently, this image includes 
the notions of science as realistic, value-free, 
naturalistic, a:::id posicivistic. Whether science ever 
was, now is, or e·Jer could be any of these things is 
doubtful. 
Scientific J..dvance: Evolution or Revolution? 
Henri Bergson (1913) thought that all of 
humankind's endeavors were moving forward with 
inevitable progress. Scientists often present science 
this way, advancing steadily and inexorably, even 
though this auto~atic progress is never defined or 
quantified. 
However, Thomas Kuhn (1970), Paul Feyerabend 
(1975), and other philosophers of science have noted 
that science does not proceed smoothly: science is "a 
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series of discontinuous replacements" (Moreland, 1989, 
p. 164). 
The history of science is a somewhat jerky story 
of replaced theories that worked for a while but 
then dropped off the scene. If this is true, then 
why should we have any confidence in the 
approximate truth of our current theories or in 
the existence of the things they postulate? A 
pessimistic induction from the history of science 
justifies our believing that since most, perhaps 
all, of past theories were later abandoned, our 
current theories will be abandoned as well. (p. 
159) 
Science does not progress smoothly. New data 
cannot be said to sharpen older theories: they 
overthrow them. The adoption of a new theory is like a 
perceptual gestalt switch. One minute the percept 
appears to look like one thins and then with a blink of 
the eye the same data can be interpreted as something 
else. 
Often little, if any, continuity exists between 
tenns in many theories. Moreland noted, for instance, 
that Thomson's and Bohr's theories of the composition 
of an atom are incommensurable, that is, they really 
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refer to two very different things (1989) . Comparing 
the word "electron" in these two theories is like 
comp~=ing the word •red" in a paper on wavelengths of 
light and communist •red" politics. In short, science 
does not grow slowly, accurately, and methodically like 
some scientists would have the public and larger 
scientific community believe. Science moves with jerks 
and spasms; it also follows false trails. Scientists 
often try to gloss over the glaring inconsistencies in 
their theories in order to preserve their respective 
systems. For this, Feyerabend, who is not known for 
understatement, has called moderr.. scientists 
intellectual criminals (Horgan, 1993). 
Realism and Antirealisrn 
Coupled with the popular idea of scientific 
optimism and the idea of automatic human progress in 
general is the notion that science provides a 
progressively truer and truer picture of the world 
(Laudan, 1990). This view, that science actually 
describes reality, is known as scientific realism or 
isomorphism (see Table 5). 
Table 5 
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Technical and Common Usage of Realism and its Opposites 
(see also Appendix Bl 
Common Usage: R~S!li~m: IQ.~S!Hlilm: 
Pragmatic, this Utopian, other 
worldly. worldly. 
Philosophy of R~ali~m: Antii;:~~li§m: 
Science: Science tells us Science provides 
about the real useful fictions 
world. about the world. 
Since the collapse of logical positivism, and 
especially since Kuhn's Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1970), an absolute faith in scientific 
realism has declined (Laudan, 1990; Van Fraasen, 1980). 
Popularizers of science often still portray science 
with realistic nomenclature, however. 
Characteristically, this view of science includes the 
idea that science has a unique methodology {i.e., the 
scientific method) that the humanities and other 
academic endeavors do not possess. 
Scientific Methcd(s} 
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Introductory science textbooks usually begin with 
a definition of science and the scientific method. 
They often attribute the advances of science to the 
adoption of this method (Moreland, 1989). 
A review of the history of science seems to bear 
this contention out to some degree. The birth of 
modern science in general is usually said to coincide 
with the inductive proposals of Francis Bacon in the 
late renaissance and the founding o= the Royal Society 
in London. These early scientists departed from 
deductive and specul::itive arguments and began to gather 
data to support their conclusions. They wanted to move 
away from speculating ho" many angels could fit on the 
head of a pin, as had been done in the medieval 
university. 
A review of Newton's Principia (1687/1990) and 
Bacon's Novwn Oraanum (1620/1990b) and Advancement of 
Learnina (1605/1990a) obviously shows that even these 
early scientists lacked method .. :ilogical agreement. 
Newton and Bacon favored ~he introduction of 
inductivism, but these documents do not contain a 
single, unanimous, timeless scientific method as 
proponents of radical empiricism assert. These men 
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were "eclectics, methodological opportunists" 
(Feyerabend, 1982, p. 641) . Newton, for instance, 
derived many of his results from mathematical models, 
not from any process resembling today's scientific 
method. 
As Moreland (1987, 1989) noted, no one scientific 
method exists,9 but rather recognizable scientific 
methodologies. Whether such a thing as a scientific 
method exists is itself a meta-scientific question that 
must be addressed by the philosophy of science 
(Feyeraber.d, 1975) . To believe that natural science 
has a specific methodology at its disposal that is 
unavailable to the human sciences, the humanities, 
philosophy, or theology is a fiction. 
Pure Empiricism 
David Hume posed this famous question about 
academic inquiry: 
Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning 
quantity or number? No. Does it contain any 
experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact 
and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: 
9 Science texts usually assume or simplify the scientific method. 
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for it can contain nothing but sophistry and 
illusion. (1748/1939, p. 689) 
As noted, scientists pride themselves in their 
liberation from deductive methods. Even though Hume's 
criteria are very narrow and would scarcely allow any 
science to take place at all, scientists often revert 
to pure empiricism. 
Besides the proble.~ of Hume's assertion being 
self-refuting (he has condemned his own book to the 
realm of sophistry and illusion) , David Hume called for 
the supre..11acy of empirical method3. The proble~ with 
radical empiricism alone is that one can never get 
beyond particular data to generalize to other possible 
phenomena {Heisenberg, 1958/1990). 
The results of Hume's criteria are seen in the 
parable about the man who filled notebook upon notebook 
with uncensored observations. Near the end of his life 
he brought them proudly to the Smithsonian. Of course, 
they had no use for them because the jumble of data was 
unstructured and uninterpretable (Moreland, 1989). 
Pure empiricism leads only to chaos and 
skepticism. A person can only claim to have a 
particular sensation or perception. Nothing more can 
be said about the data {Schaeffer, 1968b). No 
Crime and Evil 
generalizing or theorizing is admissible using purely 
empirical dictates.10 
Counterpoint: Science as Operationalisrnll 
30 
Eve stated "science is not reality ... it is, at 
best, a good approximation of reality--a model of it" 
(Stein, 1993, p. A-21). Gordon Clark (1964) believed 
that science only provides models or heuristics of the 
real world. Although he disavowed pragmatism as a 
comprehensive test for truth, he maintained that 
science solves problems and that is all. He noted that 
multiple models of the same phenomenon may have the 
same explanatory power, for instance, the wave and 
particle theories of light (Clark, 1964; Poincare, 
1905/1990). 
Clark noted that all sciences are like geometry in 
that they start with axioms (presuppositions) . Because 
lO Scientists seem to miss the point that Humean empiricism led to 
Kantian agnosticism. The real world (the thing itself) is forever 
Wlknowable. 
11 Operationalism is only one of the many nonrealist views of 
science (see also Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1970; Laudan, 1990; Van 
Fraasen, 1980) . 
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of these presuppositions, science never completely 
describes real-world entities. Clark's conclusion was 
quite amazing. No scientific law has ever described 
any real event! Nor can it. 
To show that scientific law, specifically the laws 
of Newtonian mechanism, do not describe how 
phenomena occur, the example of the pendulum will 
be used. The law of the pendulum, roughly 
expressed, states that the period of the swing is 
directly proportional to the square root of the 
length. But the scientific methods by which the 
equation is obtai~ed are based on three remarkable 
assumptions. First, the ~ass cf the bob is 
assumed to be concentrated at a poinc; that is, 
the body is homogeneous. This condition is never 
met in actuality. Second, the string must be 
tensionless. There is no such string. And third, 
the pendulum is supposed to swing on an axis 
without friction. This is impossible. The 
necessary conclusion therefore is that t..~e 
scientific law describes only non-existent 
pendulums, and that real pendulums do not move in 
accordance with the laws of physics. [italics 
added] (Clark, 1964, pp. 137-138) 
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c. S. Lewis made a complementary argurnent in his 
book, Miracles (1978). He showed that the laws of 
nature have never caused anything. He used a pool 
table for his example. The law of conservation of 
momentum describes what will happen if the cue ball is 
hit a certain way, but no law can describe how or if it 
will be hit. In this way, the so-called laws of nature 
are shown to be only sketchy illustrations: they are 
never causal. Clark's and Lewis' arguments, taken 
together, depict a science that can only discover 
regularities in nature and this only with the 
constriction of a priori presuppositions (see Table 6). 
Table 6 
Clark and C. S. Lewis on the Laws of Nature 
Gordon Clark: No scientific laws have ever described 
any real world events. 
c. s. Lewis: No scientific laws have ever caused 
anvthing. 
Operationalists note that a scientific concept is 
not an all-compassing descriptor of reality; it is 
merely a set of operations. In psychology, no 
diagnostic index of depression, for example, is ever 
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equal to what any person ever experiences as 
depression. A test may measure "MMPI-depression" or 
"Beck-depression,• which do not exist as real-world 
entities; but these instruments never measure the real, 
felt depression that individuals experience. 
The insights provided by the cperationalist 
critique mesh with the discussion of the idicgraphic 
and nomothetic above. When one strives for nomological 
generality, individual cases are not covered.12 
The operationalist assessment of naive realism is 
important to the dialogue between theology and the 
other sciences. If no hard and fast laws of nature 
exist in the Newtonian sense, then supernaturalism 
cannot be said to defy the laws of nature. 
Value-Laden Science 
Bergin (1981) and Ellis (1981) debated in The 
Journal of Clinical and Consulting Psvcholoay over 
whether the inclusion of values was appropriate in 
psychotherapy. They discussed whether any values could 
be scientific. 
12 Or, group means obscure individual differences {R. K. Bufford, 
personal communication, 1988) . 
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Interestingly, Ellis adopted two (possibly 
discordant?) models of rationality to evaluate how a 
person should behave. Ellis used a positivist cannon: 
"Is it verifiable?• He also used an egotistical one: 
"Is this what I really want?" Both of these notions of 
rationality are values (Evans, 1989). 
Indisputably, scientific enterprises are value-
laden. Psychotherapist's values are prescribed by law 
and inscribed in state licensing regulations. 
Basic researchers in all the sciences have values 
as well (Moreland, 1989) (see Table 7). These values 
Table 7 
Ihe Axiology of Science: The Values of "Value Free• 
Science 





Ooenness to Refutation 
are not always written as are the values of the 
licensed practitioner above, but they are very 
important to progress in research laboratories and 
institutions. Those who violate these norms may be 
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shunned by their colleagues, not attain tenure, or be 
refused for grants (Moreland, 1989). 
Evans (1989) argued that psychology cannot operate 
at all without a value-critical stance. Practicing 
psychologists reinforce or discourage thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors that they see as "unhealthy." 
Also, to practice psychotherapy without reference to 
implicit opinions about the meaning of life, human 
nature, or the freedom or bondage of the will, for 
instance, is impossible. Furthermore, a coherence 
between the values of the therapist and client/patient 
is a major factor affecting psychotherapy outcome 
(Bergin, 1987) . 
Still, despite the facts, psychologists and other 
scientists often Yow value neutrality. When pressed, 
they may refer to the positivist social science of 
Auguste Comte. 
Positivism in the Human Sciences 
In 1830, Comte proposed that social science (as 
well as the rest of the sciences) be founded on firmly 
positivist ground. He was very optimistic that the 
positivist approach that he inherited from his mentor, 
Saint Simon, was adequate to explain all social 
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phenomena as well as all of life itself (Mathisen, 
1990). 
The term "positive• has here the sense of that 
which is given or laid down, that which has to be 
accepted as we find it and is not further 
explicable; the word is intended to convey a 
warning against the attempts of theology and 
metaphysics to go beyond the world given to 
observation in order to enquire into first causes 
and ultimate ends. (Flew, 1979, p. 283) 
Comte's positivism actually became a religion, and 
positivist societies were organized for "worship• in 
France. Comte may be distinguished as one of the great 
early fathers of social science. However, his 
assertion that positive laws of behavior could be 
constructed cannot be substantiated. To say that no 
metaphysical statements are allowed in social science 
is self-refuting because, obviously, this statement is 
metaphysical (Popper, 1963). 
Positivist social science has the unique honor of 
being able to explain everything, except everything. 
As noted above, empirically-derived positivist theories 
cannot be used to generalize beyond specific phenomena 
(i.e., no theories are possible). Deductively-derived 
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positivist arguments never apply to any one case. 
Wolfhart Pannenberg noted: 
The price to be paid for such a reduction of the 
traditional cultural sciences to theories of 
general structures and to approaches capable in 
principle of mathematical formulation is indicated 
by Ke.'ttpski's remark that science thus defined 
merely describes a •field of possible action" from 
which real action is excluded. . . Deductive 
nomological arguments ... cannot in themselves 
supply the real cause of any particular event 
~>'hich requires explanation. (1973/1976, pp. 121, 
141) 
Naturalism: The Hidden Assumotion in Scientism 
Schaeffer noted that the Western world is now a 
post-Christian culture (Schaeffer, 1968b). Belief in 
science as the arbiter of all truth has filled the void 
left by the collapse of Christianity as the predominant 
Weltanschauung. This is especially ironic because the 
Christian world view has forcefully been argued as what 
made the birth of modern science possible (Merton, 
1938). 
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The atheistic and naturalistic presuppositions 
that science has adopted for the last 150 years are now 
seen to be essential to the ver<I continuation of 
science. Sagan, in his preface to Hawking's ~ 
Histor:y of T~, sounds like an apologist for atheism, 
not at all like an objective reviewer (1988). 
Strangely, and contrary to the opinions of the 
founders of science, current scientists often see 
atheism as a prerequisite to scientific progress. For 
instance, Gennan chemist Walter Nerst stated that 
denying the infinite duration of time would be to 
betray the very foundation of science (Jastrow, 1978). 
Eddington's emotional attachment to the idea of a 
universe without a prime mover is obvious: 
I have no axe to grind in this discussion [but} 
the notion of a beginning is repugnant to me . 
I simply do not believe that the present order of 
things started off with a bang . . the expanding 
Universe is preposterous ... incredible ... it 
leaves me cold. (Jastrow, 1978, p. 102) 
Jastrow, an eminent astrophysicist and a religious 
agnostic, pondered why these objective investigators 
are so emotional: 
I think part of the answer 
cannot bear the thought of 
which cannot be explained, 
time and money. There is a 
science. Every event 
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is that scientists 
a natural phenomenon 
even with unlimited 
kind of religion in 
can be explained in a 
rational way as the product of some previous 
event; every effect must have its cause; there is 
no First Cause ... This religious faith of the 
scientist is violated by the discovery that the 
world had a beginning under conditions in which 
the known laws of physics are not valid. and as a 
product of forces or circumstances we cannot 
discover. (1978, pp. 103-104) 
Jastrow's description of scientism is that of a 
failed religion--failed, not because science is not 
useful within limits, but because overzealous 
proponents have inflated it beyond its explanatory 
power. He noted that •it is not a matter of another 
year, another decade of work, another measurement, or 
another theory• (p. 105) . Science has no hope of 
lifting the curtain on reality. 
Scientism is self-refuting. Scientism claims that 
only what can be known scientifically can be known at 
all. Because this statement cannot be known 
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~cientifically, it is inadequate as a test for truth. 
Moreland calls this the •myth of ostrich scientism--
that needs to be laid to rest" (1989, p. 101). 
Jobnson•s Critique of Naturalism 
Naturalism is the idea that all phenomena have 
natural causes; nothing can be supernatural. Johnson 
(1991, 1993) noted that naturalism is often used to 
prove itself in a circular fashion. In this way, for 
example, nee-Darwinian theory is used to prove 
naturalism. Assuming naturalism, evolution is perhaps 
the best answer to the question of how life came to be. 
Then, evolution, which assumes naturalism, is 
fallaciously advanced as proving that only naturalistic 
explanations of origins are plausible. 
Johnson contends that scientific naturalism is not 
science at all because it does not subject itself to 
the possibility of falsification. No hypotheses are 
advanced that if falsified could diminish the view that 
the whole cosmos must be explained without reference to 
the supernatural (Popper, 1963). 
Naturalism is deemed true by definition. Evidence 
that may falsify naturalism cannot exist. Such 
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research is deemed •uninteresting and generally 
unpublishable" (Johnson, 1991, p. 152) .13 
Science's Self·I~zae 
The antirealist critique of realist science is 
successful in that it shakes the edifice of science as 
an omnipotent, sole arbiter of truth. Scientists need 
to re-examine their view of meaning because 
observations are paradigm-dependent and because 
reductionism, scientism, naturalism, and positivism are 
inadequate tests for t::-uth (Apel, 1967; Gadamer, 1982). 
Perhaps science needs herr.teneutics to enable it to 
~ncerstand itself and ~ts subject (Dilthey, 1989). 
Also, as noted, science is of ten prone to 
religious (or as currently, irreligious) zealotry. 
Perhaps, a sound hermeneutic can supply the tools to 
save science from this dogmatism (Pannenberg, 
1988/1990). 
l3 See also Plantinga (l993bl on "Darwin's Doubt.• To erect a 
science, especially psychology, on top of naturalism is impossible 
because one mus.t remain agnostic about the verisimilitude of 
reason if reason was produced by blind chance. 
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Hermeneutics is the science of interpretation. 
Hermeneutic "is connected with the name of the god 
Hermes, the messenger of the gods who announces their 
decisions• (Pannenberg, 1973/1976, p. 157). Plato 
contrasted the hermenes (interpreters) of Horner with 
those who merely recited it. Also, Aristotle's Es:J::.i.. 
Hermeneias is titled De Interpretatione in Latin. 
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According to Kuhn (1970), interpretation or 
hermeneutics is always needed in science because raw 
data do not exist and facts do not speak for 
themselves. Whenever data are gathered, they are 
gathered inside an interpretative framework. Simple 
observation is not so simple. In Kuhnian terminology, 
all observations are paradigm-dependent. Moreland 
added, "Seeing something is not a passive matter of 
receiving stimuli on one's retinae. Rather, seeing 
involves seeing as or seeing that; it involves an 
interpretive element• (1989, p. 147). 
In psychology and the social sciences, 
hermeneutics is all the more important. When 
interpreting human behavior, not just the interpretive 
framework of the data gatherer is at issue. The human 
subject performs his or her behavior in the milieu of 
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his or her O\o/Il personal and social context. "There are 
no i!llll1aculate perceptions" (Evans, 1989, p. 52). The 
observer-status of a scientist or practitioner is not 
just influenced by negative biases that need to be 
discounted or factored out. Some observers may 
understand some phenomenon that is opaque to others. 
Often observers need to be trained to notice and 
accurately report a phenomenon. For instance, a 
religious psychologist may better understand the 
psychology of religion (Evans, 1989). 
Theology as Science 
Is Theology a Science? 
Moreland (1989) noted that theology and the other 
sciences are alike in the way they formulate and test 
hypotheses. Historically, theology was considered a 
science, even the queen of the sciences. 
However, since Schleierrnacher, theology has been 
thought of as the study of subjective religious 
experience (1799/1988). To remedy this, Wolfhart 
Pannenberg (1973/1976) strove to place theology back on 
equal footing with other academic departments in the 
university. 
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Pannenberg postulated Christian theological 
propositions as real-world descriptors of reality: 
each hypothesis needs to stand or fall on its own 
merits. Helmut Thielicke also thought theology was a 
science (1992). Barth agreed, but would not make 
theology submit to narrow definitions of science 
(Wissenschaft) (Barth, 1962). 
Millard Erickson (1985) agreed with Barth that 
theology has its own internal consistency, tnat it 
advances with a consistent method, and that it deals 
with objective data (see Table 8). Moreland (1989) 
added that theology does in fact make predictions from 
its data and retrodictions (explanations of past 
phenomena) just like other sciences (see Table 9) . In 
short, theology describes the real world just as well 
as any other science. 
Mortimer Adler (l990b) argued that the unity of 
truth implies that theological study produces the same 
kinds of knowledge that other scientific disciplines 
produce. He rejected as Averroeism the recent views of 
Joseph Campbell and others that religion is mythic and 
contains only poetic truth. The scholastic and 
Averroeist views of truth will be further discussed 
below. 
Table 8 
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Theology's Coherence (based on Moreland, 1989) 
1. Theology has a definite subject matter. 
2. Theology deals with the objective, not just with 
subjective feelings. 
3. Theology has a definite methodology. 
4. Theology has a method for verifying its 
propositions. 
S. There is a coherence among its propositions. 
Table 9 
Theolcgy's Ccr~esno~Ce~ce with Rea:ity 
1. Theology abides by the cannons of logic. 
2. Theology is communicable. 
3. Theology uses scientific methods. 
4. Theology makes predictions and retrodictions. 
5. Theology shares subject matter with other sciences. 
Sacra Doctrina Versus Scientific Dialogue 
The abstract possibility of theology being a 
science might not bother too many investigators. 
However, if theology were to lay claim to the right to 
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enter into academic dialogue with other sciences, many 
scientists would become nervous indeed. 
So first, the limits that the traditional sciences 
place on theology will be discussed. Then, whether 
theology can converse equally with the other sciences 
will be ascertained. 
Harvey Conn noted how science •shakes up• 
hermeneutics to provide what he called "distancing." 
This keeps theology from reifying its conclusions. He 
wrote: 
Extrabiblical disciplines have also initiated the 
irritation process that leads to distancing. The 
behavioral sciences--psychology, cultural 
anthropology, linguistics, sociology, 
communications--are more and more shaking the 
cloistered world of the theologian and the church 
member. And out of this engagement, this 
intersection, new reexaminations are taking place 
in the hermeneutical spiral. (1988, p. 205) 
Conn also noted that this irritation process makes 
many Christian people uncomfortable. And some have 
opted for making scripture an independent authority. 
This parallels St. Thomas' elevation of theology beyond 
the pale of other human inquiry. The investigation of 
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scripture, in this model, yields a sacra doctrina which 
cannot be questioned. This sacra doctrina is extant 
today in the religious antipsychologies of Adams 
(1970), Hunt (1987) and others. Har;ey Conn, a 
colleague of Adams, continued: 
One of the dangers in this kind of response is 
that it can split apart the Word of God in the 
Bible (special revelation) from the Word of God in 
creation (general revelation) . Is not creation 
also a continual source of God's truth (Ps. 19:1; 
Romans 1:20)? Car.not wise men and women, touched 
by the Spirit, ~lso unlock divine truth through 
disciplined study of the cr~ation? The 
henneneutical task, after all, does not allow us 
to isolate the world we live in from the world of 
the Bible. (1988, p. 205) 
Because no science should be elevated to sacra 
doctrina status, all sciences were created equal and 
can affect all other sciences via henneneutics. 
Perhaps theology has the right, even the logical 
necessity, to dialogue with the other sciences. 
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Theology's Place Among the Sciences 
Theology and the other special sciences are prone 
to dogmatism and imperialism. Only a critical look at 
the special sciences through the lens of the philosophy 
of science can keep science from becoming pseudo-
science. 
Dualistic views of science are false and 
unhelpful. The human science approach is constructive 
if one realizes that all science that is done by humans 
is in part a human science. Thus all sciences require 
hermeneutics. 
No single definition of science exists. All such 
definitions are meta-scientific and hence 
philosophical. Science is theory-dependent and value-
laden. 
Not only is theology a science, but all science 
(as well as all human endeavors) is religious. A two-
fold position (religious and regular) to truth is 
unhelpful and misleading. This bifurcated epistemology 
of science should be avoided. 
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An Augustinian Epistemology of Science 
Intecrration of Psychology and Theoloay 
If nothing else, the preceding discourse has shown 
that the nature of science is a meta-scientific 
question. Furthermore, Copleston, the Thornist scholar, 
argued that no friction exists between theology and the 
sciences per se. 
In general, the relation of science to religion 
and theology is not one of acute tension: the 
tension which in the last century ·.ias o::ten 
alleged to exist between them does not really 
exist at all. The theoretical difficulty arises 
rather in regard to the relation of philosophy to 
theology. (1985, p. 424) 
An adequate philosophy of science makes the 
integration cf the sciences possible. No science 
should be excluded from the debate a priori. 
In studying the phenomena of crime, for instance, 
sociology, psychology, neurology, theology, penology, 
and jurisprudence may all have legitimate contributions 
to make. Further, the work of one special science may 
either confirm or contradicc the conclusions of 
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another. This tension indicates that further 
investigation is necessary (Dooyeweerd, 1960/1980). 
Darwin's Solution 
so 
The early Charles Darwin was apparently aware of 
the impending division between theology and biology 
that his work might cause. Interestingly, Darwin cited 
Francis Bacon in the preface to his Origin of Species: 
Let no man out of a weak conceit of sobriety, or 
an ill-applied moderation, think or maintain, that 
a man can search too far or be too well studied in 
the book of God's word, or in the book of God's 
works; divinity or philosophy; but rather let men 
endeavour an endless progress or prof icience in 
both. (1859/1990, p. xil 
This research will argue that Darwin was correct 
in appealing to both special revelation and God's 
creation as foundational for his investigation.14 
14 Plantinga noted that belief in God is properly basic (i.e., one 
may have epistemic warrant to believe in God) at least under some 
conditions. This avoids the trap of having to prove a basic 
presupposition via the methods of classical foundationalism 
(Plantinga, 1983; l993a; l993b). 
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Whether he actually used the method he advocated is 
doubtful, but a critique of the Origin is outside the 
scope of this work. 
The Modern Confusion of Reason 
Modern thought straddles between rationalism and 
irrationalism (Bloesch, 1992; Plantinga, 1983). The 
failure of rationalism to deliver what it promised has 
caused many thinkers to shift to irrationalism. As 
Francis Schaeffer (1968b) called it, a "line of 
despair• was crossed. Since this "escape from reason," 
morals, absolutes, beauty, and goodness have been 
reduced to matters of taste (Schaeffer, 1968a). 
According to Schaeffer (196ab), Kierkegaarde was 
the first to cross this line of despair. More 
recently, Martin Heidigger (1968) redefined thought as 
that which goes beyond the rational. In his What is 
Called Thinkina, he asserted that despite all of our 
apparent thinking we are still not yet thinking. 
According to Heidigger, this is because since the time 
of the pre-Socractic philosophers, reason has turned 
away from the thinker. Krabbendam (1980) offered a 
similar, but decidedly Reformed analysis. According to 
Krabbendam, the-rationalism/irrationalism dichotomy is 
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theoretical thought in an apostatic direction. 
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In antiquity, Augustine (1952) avoided positing a 
dichotomy between theology and the other sciences by 
postulating •credo ut intelligam• (I believe in order 
to understand). To Augustine and to Anselm (1969) 
after him, no bifurcation in theoretical thought 
existed. He was free to •spoil the Egyptians,• that is 
to adopt any and all valuable elements in the world as 
a person of faith. He wrote: 
For, as the Egyptians had not only the idols and 
heavy burdens which the people of Israel hated and 
fled from, but also vessels and ornaments of gold 
and silver, and garments, which the same people 
when going out of Egypt appropriated to 
then~elves, designing them for a better use. 
(1990, p. 737) 
The Reformers and the Better Use of Reason 
Martin Luther distinguished between the 
ministerial and magisterial use of reason. When reason 
is used magisterially, it is made absolute. 
Contrawise, the ministerial use of reason is reason 
serving faith (Bloesch, 1992). 
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John Calvin noted that the knowledge of God and of 
creation (in this case, ourselves) are a unity: 
Our wisdom, in so far as it ought to be deemed 
true and solid wisdom, consists almost entirely of 
two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves. 
But as these are connected by many ties, it is not 
easy to determine which of the two precedes, and 
gives birth to the other. (1536/1990, p. ll 
On Averroeism 
Mortimer Adler described how Averroes, the A=abic 
interpreter of Aristotle in the middle ages, reconciled 
his faith ar.d the deliverances of reason. According tc 
Adler, Averroes proclaimed •there were two different 
bodies of truth: on the one hand the truths of faith; 
on the other hand the truths of reason. These two 
bodies of truth existed in what might be called 'logic-
tight compartments'" (1990b, p. 24). 
The Relioious A Priori of All Theoretical Thouoht 
Thomas Aquinas, also a medieval interpreter of 
Aristotle, adopted a different line of thought that was 
ultimately no more helpful. In the Summa Theoloaica I, 
1, 5, St. Thomas (1990) asserted that sacra doctrina is 
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sciences. He believed that theology was the regina 
scientarium (the queen of the sciences) and that all 
other branches of knowledge serve theology: the 
secular sciences are the handmaidens of theology.15 
Aquinas claimed exegetical verification for elevating 
theology by allegorically interpreting Proverbs 9:3. 
Wisdom has "sent out her maidens, she cries out from 
the highest places of the city."16 17 
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Dooyeweerd posited that the elevation of theology 
to an other-worldly preeminence by the scholastic 
theologians was a syncretism, melding Greek and 
Christian thought: "The whole conception of the so-
called sacred theology as the regina scientarium was of 
Greek origin• (1960/1980, p. 115). 
This dualism lifts theology above and pits it 
against the other sciences. The same forced dichotomy 
can be found in the other Greek dualisms: form/matter, 
15 a.ocilla r:.heologiae. 
16 The New King James Version. 
17 See Ramm (1954) on allegorical interpretation in the Middle 
Ages. 
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substance/accidents, and phenomena/noumena, for 
instance (Spier, 19S4/1979). 
In St. Thomas' use of the term sacra doctrina, 
theology is raised to the rank of a supernatural 
science exceeding all other sciences both in dignity 
and certainty of knowledge (Dooyeweerd, 1960/1980) . 
AqUinas surely thought he was rendering theology a 
great service; instead, he uncoupled all scientific 
endeavors from the Word of God. 
Can Th:;;_g_locry Domir.ace Science? 
All the data of creation must be open to 
theoretical ir.quiry. Some thinkers attempt to use 
theology, itself a science, to regulate the other 
sciences, while at the same time, keeping theology 
above the fray. Spier noted: 
This fact . is sometimes ignored, as in the 
case when the attempt is made to erect a Biblical 
or religious psychology or anthropology from 
Biblical data exclusively. We must examine God's 
works scientifically. We must reflectively 
contemplate all of created reality and must focus 
our attention upon the cosmos itself. (19S4/1979, 
p. 9) 
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No one particular science can provide the framework for 
integrating other sciences, including psychology and 
theology. 
These fundamental theoretical problems exceed the 
boundaries of all special sciences. They are of a 
philosophical character, since their solution 
requires a theoretical total view of our temporal 
horizon of experience. Can Christian dogmatic 
theology as such provide us with this 
philosophical total view? (Dooyeweerd, 1960/1980, 
p. 129) 
If so, then theology is no longer a science at 
all. It can no more provide a total view than biology, 
economics, or organic chemistrJ (Snoke, 1991). 
Making theology the taslanaster over any other 
aspect of creation or mode of inquiry is actually 
idolatry (Romans 1:25). Any view, even a so~called 
Christian view, which makes this central and radical 
sense of God's Word (or even general revelation, i.e., 
the creation) dependent on theology, is unbiblical in 
its very fundamentals. 
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The Reliaious Root of Scientific Thouaht 
As noted previously, all scientific activity 
betrays some religious commitments. God's living word-
revelation to humanity cannot be the object of any 
single science; it is instead the central starting 
point of all human endeavors. 
According to Dooyeweerd, as long as humankind's 
ear was open to God's general revelation (phanerosis), 
he or she was able to understand the world in all its 
diversity as being the one creation of God. But now, 
epistemological dualism has affected all thinking about 
science. Dooyeweerd wrote: 
By ascribing to t~e so-called natural reason an 
autonomy over against faith and the divine 
revelation, traditional scholastic theology merely 
gave expression to the false Greek view of reason 
as the center of human nature. (1960/1980, p. 140) 
All science needs to be erected on the foundation 
of a radically Christian philosophy of science. The 
only other choice is a foundation of apostasy and 
fallacy. A philosophy of science made to conform on 
the surface with certain proof texts or ecclesiastical 
doctrines would not be rendered harmless. The result 
would only be a pseudointegration. 
Crime and Evil 
58 
The question is not whether a science should be 
philosophically founded. It already is. The only 
question is which foundation to build upon (Spier, 
1954/1979) . 
Rushdoony (1960/1980) noted that humanity creates 
a monster when it deifies science. In Bultmann's 
(1958) thought, for instance, science is first 
uncritically accepted as part of his program of 
demythologizing. Ironically, Bultmann later becomes 
wary of science as a source of evil. 
Instead, the consistently Christian view, which 
refuses to idolize any aspect of creation including 
reason or science, can deliver a faithful and true 
science. "The view thus which seemingly 'rejects' 
science becomes the only source of true science, 
whereas any view which makes absolute that which is 
relative ends up by destroying the value of that aspect 
of creation and emasculating life and experience" 
(Rushdoony, 1960/1980, p. xv). 
£§.ychology Coram Deol8 
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Archimedes reputedly said, "Give me a fixed point 
and I will move the earth." On adopting the only 
adequate Archimedean point, Spier (1954/1979) wrote: 
No one can occupy a position outside of himself. 
Our starting point may not be separate from 
ourselves, because it must be the starting point 
of the philosophy in which we are actively 
engaged. . Such an Archimedean point is to be 
found only in the heart or the soul of man ... 
The heart or soul of :nan may never be identified 
with any of our vital functions such as feeling or 
faith. It is deeper than any vit.al functicn, for 
man transcends in the bond with God all temporal 
created reality. The heart is the point where the 
whole human existence concentrates itself, where 
man determines his relationship to God. (pp. 16-
17) 
Dooyeweerd and Spier nowhere attempted to define 
the heart, since it is the deepest (created) 
presupposition. Dooyeweerd also noted that the choice 
lS Coram Deo (Latin, in the presence of God) . 
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The Cross-Traffic Amoncr Psychology. Theology and the 
Rest of the Sciences 
Psychology is a scientific enterprise. As such, 
it must be unde:;;,stood in the context of all the 
sciences. It uses idiographic and nomothetic methods 
to study its subject; it has attributes of the natural 
and human sciences and must use hermeneutics and be 
value-critical in order to access meaning. 
As a science, psychology cannot be positivistic, 
caturalistic, or scientistic without being internally 
contradictory. It may be empirical but must avoid the 
empiricist fallacy. It cannot provide the investigator 
with absolute reality, but it' can deliver models of 
reality. Instead, psychology is inherently religious. 
Like all human enterprises it has a religious root or 
radix. 
Theology is also a scientific activity; hence, 
theology is an equal partner with the other special 
sciences. No human enterprise can be arbiter of truth. 
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No human endeavor, theology included, can be allowed to 
become the mediatorl9 of all truth. 
Augustine's view of truth is more cogent than 
Averroes' two-fold division of reality. "For to the 
concept of truth belongs the unity of all truth, that 
is, the simultaneous existence, without contradiction, 
of each individual truth with all other truths" 
(Pannenberg, 1988/1990, p. 169). 
The recent revolution in the philosophy of science 
has made science's pretheoretical commitments, 
including its religious character, explicit. :f 
psychological science is characterized by a neglect of 
God at its very root, that a.lone is enough to expleti:-. 
psychology's general neglect of evil as a subject of 
study. 
The view of science developed here makes the 
inquiry into both crime and evil possible. If evil is 
part of the data set of human experience, then the 
scientific investigation of evil is possible. Such an 
inqui::y requires the tools· of theological science. 
Theologians have produced some significant results in 
their study of evil. In the next section, these 
19 There is but one mediator {l Timothy 2:5). 
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theological results will be consulted conjointly with 
other scientific data pertaining to criminological 
psychology. As this investigation ensues, an attempt 
will be made to pre·rent any one special science from 
ascending as regina scientarium. 
CHAPTER 3 
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THEORY: CRIME, EVIL, A.&.'ID HUMAN NATURE 
The Scientific View of Crime and Evil 
A forensic psychology that has rejected absolute 
scientism, positivism, and naturalism is emancipated to 
view humankind in general and criminals in particular 
as moral agents who have broken the moral law. As 
noted in chapter 2, this is episterr.ologically 
legiti~atc and ir. keeping ~ith currant advances in tne 
philosophy of science. Also, as noted above, this is 
consistent with the conunon-sense attribution that 
criminality is both pathological and morally wrong. 
Furthermore, adding a theological analysis 
broadens the scope of inquiry and is more common-
sensical. Because theology is a science, adding a 
theological analysis to the inquiry makes it no less 
scientific. 
Crime and Eyil Examined 
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Although psychologists are called upon to render 
opinions about criminals, neither the term crime nor 
the term evil are part of psychological or psychiatric 
nomenclature. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manua1 
(DSM-III-R) has no diagnostic category or 
epidemiological data on either criminals or evil-doers, 
per se (American Psychiatric Association [APA] , 1987) . 
!n DSM-III-R, however, several diagnoses are 
closely related to criminal behavior. Antisocial 
Personality Disorder (APD) and Conduct Disorder in 
children are characterized by criminal conduct. 
Several of the paraphilias, most notably Pedophilia, 
cannot be diagnosed without a crime having taken place. 
Impulse control disorders such as Kleptomania and 
Pyromania necessitate theft and arson respectively'. 
Furthermore, other seemingly neutral mental disorders 
may be considered causal of various criminal acts. 
Schizophrenia, Affective Disorders and several 
Personality Disorders are often cited as inducing 
criminal behavior (Meloy, 1992). 
Criminality is not a psychological term. It can 
be investigated psychologically, however. The quasi-
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psychological character of criminality will be 
discussed after crime and evil are briefly explained. 
The idea of causality in criminal behavior will 
then be investigated. The argument will be that evil 
may be admissible as a scientific cause of crime. 
Then several current psychological and psychiatric 
theories of criminality will be presented. Even though 
some of the theorists responsible for them profess a 
positivist agenda, the intent will be to show that they 
all implicitly contain the idea of hunian evil. 
Last, some of the insights of theological 
anthropology will be introduced to make explicit what 
has been ir:lplicit. That is, evil and crime must be 
explored together to cle2.rly understand the phenomenon 
of criminal behavior. 
Crime Defined 
The fifteenth edition of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica defined crime as "the intentional commission 
of an act usually deemed socially harmful or dangerous 
and specifically defined, prohibited and punishable 
under criminal law• (1992, p. 736). The penal codes of 
various jurisdictions and the several law dictionaries 
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use similar definitions (Black, 1991; Deering's 
California Penal Code, 1985). 
The two common compilations of crime incidence and 
prevalence data in the U.S., the Unifo:r:m Crime Report 
(UCR) and the National Crime Survey (NCS) limit their 
definitions of crime to several •index crimes.•20 This 
is done both for methodological reasons (i.e., 
definitional unifo:r:mity) and to describe the crimes 
that matter most to researchers, law enforcement, and 
the general public. 
Walters (1990) in his psychological study of 
"lifestyle criminality• also limited his research to 
what he called •patterns of serious criminal conduct." 
To specify a rather narrow definition of crime is 
necessary in order to say anything meaningful about it 
at all. 
Narrow definitions of criminality yield both pros 
and cons. On the one hand, to know how murder and 
mayhem relate to driving three miles an hour over the 
speed limit or taking pencils from work would be 
interesting. However, these minor infractions are 
20 The OCR index crimes are murder, rape, robbery, aggravated 
assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson. 
Crime and Evil 
67 
impossible to measure. The indetectability and prima 
facia triviality of petty crimes does not mean that one 
should reify the useful distinction between serious and 
minor offenses. A relationship across the criminal 
continuum may still exist (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 
1987). 
For practical purposes, forensic psychologists and 
sociologists of crime define crime specifically. This 
study dealt with severe, chronic criminality. The 
diagnosis of APD, the psychological construct 
psychopathy, a!ld the criminal personality as conceived 
by Yochelson and Samer.ow were used to exa...~ine the 
phenomenon of crime (APA, 1987; Hare, 1980; Millon, 
1985; Yochelson & Samenow, 1976). 
Evil Defined 
Evil behavior, as defined by the dictionary, is 
any action that is •morally bad or wrong; wicked" 
(American Heritaae Dictionary, 1992). Psychologists 
are often uncomfortable with discussions of evil, and 
some still advocate value-free science (Ellis, 1981). 
This is an inconsistent assertion because it is a value 
preference. 
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Some investigators allude to Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle in their defense of a morally 
neutral science. They argue that because reality is 
fundamentally indeterminate, only subjective values are 
scientifically defensible. Mortimer Adler disagreed. 
The fact that the ontological determinateness of 
the electron's position and velocity is not 
measurable by physicists and so is of no interest 
to them does not mean that it has no real 
existence, any more than time not measurable by 
physicists lacks reality. The substitution of the 
word •indeterminacy" for the word •uncertainty" 
indicates the illicit conversion by the Copenhagen 
school of a subjective into an objective 
probability. (1990b, p. 72) 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle does not mean that 
reality is ontologically indeterminate; only that it is 
sometimes epistemologically uncertain. 
A close reading of the proponents of value-free 
psychology reveals that they do promote one set of 
values over another. currently, to extend Freud's 
analysis of development and blame the patient's parents 
is popular (Forward, 1989). This changes the time and 
place of the wickedness, but not its existence. 
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Furthermore, psychologists are required by 
professional ethics codif~ed both by the APA and by 
state regulations to make moral and ethical judgments 
about themselves and others (Sales, 1983). To agree 
that moral and ethical standards are binding among 
colleagues and then assert that they are irrelevant to 
the society at large is inconsistent. 
A complete exposition of current ethics and how 
one decides what is right and wrong is outside the 
scope of this inquiry. However, Geisler (1971) noted 
absolute moral relativism is at an intellectual 
deadend because relativism logically leads to amoral 
nihilism, which necessarily concludes that no act is 
morally better or worse than any other. A general 
consensus exists among ethicists that at least some 
acts are morally better than others. Moral and ethical 
distinctions are not altogether meaningless (Lewis, 
1990). 
In order to determine what is right and wrong, 
psychologists need to consult state-of-the-art academic 
work in jurisprudence, ethics, and moral theology. 
Even if these sources of truth are unwisely ignored, 
the concept of human evil will find its way into 
criminological psychology of its own accord. Katz 
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(1988), in The Seduction of Crime: Moral and Sensual 
Attractions of poinq Eyil, documented a secular 
criminology of temptation, a drive to do evil·~or 
evil's sake. 
The Quasi-Psychological Nature of Criminality 
Psychologists work with criminals, but being a 
criminal does not make one a mental patient. 
Criminality is a multidimensional problem with 
individual, societal, economic, moral and other facets. 
The psychological analysis of criminality may be the 
most important (Eysenck, 1977). However, investigators 
in various fields of knowledge have a legitimate 
interest in criminology. This is why psychologists 
need to recognize the quasi-psychological nature of 
criminality. 
Edwin Shneidman's (1993) work on suicide provides 
an appropriate illustration because suicide is a crime 
in many jurisdictions. More importantly, like 
criminology, suicidology is done by investigators in 
many fields. Shneidman, a psychologist, argued that 
suicide is not understandable as a psychological 
phenomenon alone (see Table 10) . 
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Table 10 
Various Contemoorary Aoorcaches to Criminolocv in 
General and Suicidology in Particular 
Shn~iQ.rnan' §! L~vel~ of R~~~iar~h~r§! of C:drr.e(Bvil 
Analv.:;iq in Suicidolocrv Usina ~hneidrl'an•.:; Levels 
Life Historv Sarnenow (1984) 
Personal Documents Abrahamsen (1985) 
Dernoaraohic/Eoidernioloaical McCord & McCord (1964) 
Philosoohical/Theoloaical Staub (1989): Hick (1977) 
Sociocultural Montaqu (1976) 
Socioloqical Farrinaton2: 
Dvadic and Famil'' Elizur & MinuchiZJ. (1989) 
Psvchiatric Millon (1985); APA (1987) 
Psvchodvnamic Melov (1988; 1992) 
Psvcholoaical Hare (1980): Sarne now (1984) 
Constitutional Wilson & Herrnstein (1985) 
Bioloaical/Biochemical Raine & Dunkin (1990) 
Shneidman noted: 
the most evident fact abouc suicidology and 
suicidal events is that they are multidimensional, 
2l Barnett, Blumstein, Cohen, & Farrington (1992). 
--
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multifaceted, multidisciplinary--containing, as 
they do, concomitant biological, _sociological, 
psychological (interpersonal and intrapsychicl, 
epidemiological, and philosophical elements. 
(1993, p. 56) 
In a similar way, any theory of criminality that 
attempts to describe crime as it occurs in vivo should 
account for crime's quasi-psychological character, 
including its metaphysical and theological elements 
(e.g., the existence of real evil). A robust 
criminological theory must account for the evil that 
criminals do. 
The Causes of Crime 
Etiology 
Several recent investigators have sought to of fer 
large scale, comprehensive psychological explanations 
for severe criminality (Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989; 
Walters, 1990; Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). Finding the 
cause of crime has become a cause celebre. 
The idea of causality in psychology is itself very 
complicated. Perhaps one's view of causality functions 
as an unexamined assumption that affects the 
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cormnonly used e'!Uivocally (Adler, 1990a). 
Interestingly, the concept of etiology (or 
aetiology) now used in medicine and psychology was 
first used criminologically (Liddell & Scott, 1968). 
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For instance, in the New Testament, azrza is used of the 
charges against Jesus Christ and Paul (John 18:38; Acts 
25:19,27) (Arndt & Gingrich, 1957; Gingrich, 1965). 
"In its legal sense it was used to point out where the 
responsibility lay• (Adler, 1990a, p. 120). 
F;:i.nds of Causes 
Hippocrates (1990) believed that all diseases had 
both hwnan and divine etiologies. Bonhoeffer (1971) 
dismissed this idea as limiting God to being a "God of 
the gaps.• Moreland (1989) noted that Bonhoeffer's 
objection is irrational because all of science is 
plagued by many such gaps with no apparent weakening of 
its prestige. The notion of human and divine causation 
has been with both psychology and medicine from the 
beginning. 
Hippocrates (1990) also divided causes into 
predisposing and exciting factors. This simple 
distinction helps clarify the current psychological 
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notion of etiology by separating the concepts of 
diathesis and stress. 
Aristotle developed the Greek notion of etiology 
best in the pqsterior Analytics (1990b). Here, he 
enumerated four different kinds of causality: 
material, formal, efficient, and final (see Table 11). 
Table 11 
Etiology Accordina to Aristotle 
'typ!il§l Qt: ll.b:i:i!tQtglJ.an ShQ!il P§lV!:;hQlQg;i.l:;al Examo!e 
~S!Y§l~§l Ex::imnle 
Material Leather IBioloqical Orqanism 
Formal The Pattern The Design Plan 
Efficient The Shoemaker rt'he Agent or Subiect 
Final The Shoe's Puroose The Behavioral Puroose 
Aristotle's distinctions express the different 
conceptions of cause implicit in discussions of the 
causes of crime. The criminal is a human being who was 
designed by God (or evolution, for that matter) to be a 
normal person. Ideas of good behavior and 
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psychological wellness presuppose the concept of proper 
function (or formal cause) .22 
The material cause is the biological organism as 
he or she exists when the crime is committed: the 
material cause may include any biochemical or 
neuroanatomical equipment and all previously learned 
behavior. 
The efficient cause is the moral agent with the 
capacity to act, delimited, of course, by the other 
causes. The final cause is the reason or purpose of 
the activity as apprehended by the agent and/or by God. 
As Wilson and Herrnstei~ (1985) noted, the 
question of what causes crime, nature or nurture, is a 
poorly phrased query. Causality in psychology is at 
least as complicated as causality in medicine 
(diathesis/stress) . The concept of cause or etiology 
should not be used naively. 
Cause has several meanings. Logically, a single 
cause of crime will be impossible to find. The word 
cause needs to be specifically defined in each context. 
Otherwise investigators will find themselves working at 
cross-purposes. 
22 See Plantinga, Warrant and Prooer Function (l993a) . 
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Theological causality, advanced by both 
Hippocrates and Aristotle, should be admitted today. 
Also, classical use of cause rescues the idea of 
purposive behavior and moral agency while preserving 
the role of material causality. 
Psychological Nosology of Crime: Four Theories 
The number of theories of criminality probably 
equal the number of researchers and practitioners 
studying criminals. Psychological theories can be 
divided into two basic classes, those that attempt to 
explain specific criminal ac~s {like pedophilia, arson, 
serial homicide, etc.) and those that attempt to 
explain criminality in a more general way. 
Following is an exploration of four current 
psychological theories of criminality (see Table 12) . 
Cleckley (1941) first described psychopathy as it is 
currently construed. Two basic streams of psychopathy 
research are extant today: the work of Robert Hare 
(1980) as operationalized in the Psychopathy Check List 
(PCL) and psychoanalytic psychopathy (Meloy, 1988; 
1992). Antisocial Personality Disorder is current 
psychiatric terminology and was influenced largely by 
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the personality research of Theodore Millon (1990). 
Also, the work of Samenow (1984) and Yochelson and 
Samenow (1976) is discussed. Their construct, the 
criminal personality, is often used in correctional 
settings (Thaler, 1991; Weinstock, 1990). 
Table 12 
A Groupina of current Forensic Psvcholoaical Theories 
of Criminality. 
Th~Qri~!:; The,..,rv 
Hare (1930) I Cleckley' s Psvcho'Oathv 
Meloy (1988) Psvchoa:calvtic Psvchonatb" 
Millon (1986) A.."ltisocial P-ersonality 
Same now (1984) Criminal Personality 
Psychopathy 
I 
Cleckley (1941) sketched the currently accepted 
portrait of the psychopath. He brought together 
earlier research on psychopathic inferiority and moral 
imbecil~ty and formulated the concept of the 
psychopathic personality. Cleckley's construct heavily 
influenced the first edition of the DiagnQstic and 
Stai:;isi:;ical Manual of Mental Disorders (American 
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Psychiatric Association [APA], 1952). DSM-II, III, and 
III-R have moved toward a broader, more inclusive 
category with the diagn0~is Antisocial Personality 
Disorder, which is discussed below (Eysenck, 1986; 
Millon, 1986) . 
Pinel (1801) used the term ~.anie san delire to 
describe impulsive, criminal offenders who lacked the 
delusions of the typical mental patient. Pritchard 
(Thaler, 1991) and Rush (1812/1972) characterized 
severe criminals as morally blameworthy, with Pritchard 
originating the term •moral insanity.• 
About one hundred years ago, Cesare Lombroso 
(1968) described severe criminals as atavistic throw-
backs to earlier evolutionary development. His view 
combined some currently accepted criteria of 
psychopathy (lack of conscience, aggressivity, and 
insensitivity to social criticism) with the now 
discredited notion that criminals possessed a kind of 
visually discernible "Neanderthal" look (McCord & 
McCord, 1964). 
Goring used statistical analyses to discredit 
Lombroso's physical criteria. He demonstrated that so-
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called atavistic physical features23 were just as 
common in a sample of college students24 (Meloy, 1988; 
Yochelson & Samenow, 1976). 
Koch was the first to describe severe criminals as 
psychopathic, and Birnbaum used the tenn sociopathic, 
terminology that is still accepted psychological 
nomenclature (Meloy, 1988; Thaler, 1991). Psychopathy 
and sociopathy are often used synonymously (Reid, Dorr, 
Walker, & Bonner, 1986). Cleckley (1976) described 
sixteen clinical signs of psychopathy (see Table 13). 
23 Not all physical traits are unrelated to criminality. 
Mesomorphy (muscular build) is significantly associated (Wilson & 
Herrnstein, 1985) . Meurological substrates are disputed: some 
studies note cortical immaturity and bilateral slowing of 
electroencephalograms. Studies of brain damaage in adult 
criminals may be confounded by dzug abuse and head trauma, which 
are ubiquitous in this population. 
24 Genetic sequelae are outside the scope of this study. Walters 
and White (1989) recently performed a meta-analysis of 38 studies. 
The better designed studies showed the least effects. 
Table 13 
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Cleckley's Sixteen Indicators of Psychopathy 
l. Superficial charm and good intelligence 
2. Absence of delusions and other signs of irrational 
thinking 
3. Absence of nervousness and other psychoneurotic 
manifestations 
4. Unreliability 
5. Untruthfulness and insincerity 
6. Lack of remorse and shame 
7. Inadequately motivated antisocial behavior 
8. Poor judgment and failure to learn from experience 
9. Pathological egocentricity and incapacity for love 
10. General poverty of major affective relations 
ll. Specific loss of insight 
12. Unresponsiveness in interpersonal behavior 
13. Fantastic and uninviting behavior with drink and 
sometimes without 
14. Suicide rarely carried out 
15. Sex life impersonal, trivial and poorly integrated 
16. Failure to follow any life plan 
Currently, Hare and Meloy are producing a 
continuous stream of research on psychopathy (Gacono, 
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Meloy & Heaven, 1990; Hare, 1965, 1966, 1970, 1980, 
1985; Meloy & Gacono, 1988). These researchers follow 
Cleckley's tradition. Hare (1980) wrote as an 
atheoretical general psychologist and has 
operationalized Cleckley's psychopathy with his 
Psychopathy Check-List (see Appendix Cl. Meloy, a 
psychodynamic theorist, has written extensively on 
psychopathy. He retained Cleckley's view but 
classified psychopathy as a variant of Narcissistic 
Personality Disorder (Kernberg, 1984). 
Forth, Hart, and Hare (1988) noted that only 15-
20% of incarcerated felons meet the criteria io~ 
psychopathy as operationalized in the Psychopathy Check 
List. Even so, Hare and McPherson (1984) opined that 
they cow.mit a disproportionately large number of 
serious crimes. 
Hare explained psychopathy as a cluster of 
personality traits and behaviors. He listed 
irresponsibility, impulsivity, hedonism, selfishness, 
egocentricity, low frustration tolerance, lack of 
guilt, remorse, or shame, and a chronically unstable 
and antisocial lifestyle as diagnostic of psychopathy. 
Psychopaths are also selfish, callous, and exploitative 
in their use of others, and often become involved in 
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socially deviant behaviors. According to Hare, these 
traits and behaviors appear in psychopaths without the 
attendant signs of other mental illness or deficiency 
(Hare & Jutai, 1983). 
Hare (1970) noted that the personality structure 
and life history of the psychopath are quite different 
from those of the person whose antisocial or criminal 
behavior results from living in a criminal subculture. 
Unlike the psychopath, these individuals may be capable 
of forming strong, affectionate relationships and of 
experiencing concern and guilt over their behavior. 
Meloy (1988; 1992), on the other hand, linked 
psychopathy with the other character or personality 
disorders. He and other psychodynamic researchers note 
that, like the other personality disorders, the general 
factor in psychopathy is narcissism (Gacono, 1990; 
Gacono, Meloy, & Heaven, 1990). 
Hare's factor analytic studies of the PCL can be 
interpreted in accord with Meloy•s opinion that 
psychopathy is an aggressive variant of narcissistic 
personality. Two factors have been identified. Factor 
1 measures •a selfish, remorseless and exploitive use 
of others." Factor 2 describes an unstable, antisocial 
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lifestyle and is more behavioral (Harpur, Hare & 
Hakstian, 1989, p. 6). 
Psychopaths are among the most treatment resistant 
of all psychological patients. This may be due to 
their lower than normal levels of distress and their 
perceptions that nothing is wrong in their behavior 
(Hare, 1970). Nevertheless, some studies have shown 
that the behaviors of some psychopaths seem to become 
less grossly antisocial with age. Other studies have 
shown that psychopaths actually remain criminally 
active longer than other criminals (Hare & Jutai, 
1983) • 
.R.>1Y.choana l yt i c Psychgoa th? 
Psychologists and psychiatrists, beginning with 
Freud, have theorized that crime is a result of 
superego deficits. Although Freud was never optimistic 
about using psychoanalysis to treat character disorders 
(Freud, 1939/1990), his followers adapted his 
techniques to treat criminality and other personality 
disorders (Hartmann, 1940). Lowen (1985), the Reichian 
analyst, believed psychopathy is a variant of 
narcissism. He seemed to believe that he could 
successfully treat all character disorders. 
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Newer, nee-analytic explanations may hold more 
promise for understanding and treating character-level 
pathology, including psychopathy. The ego and self 
psychologists (Kernberg, 1984; AOhut, 1971), as well as 
the object-relations theorists (Hamilton, 1988, 1992; 
Winicott, 1953), propose an active faculty that 
organizes reality into cognitive schema. 
These cognitive templates are both interpersonal 
anu affect-laden (Kendall & Braswell, 1993). Yochelson 
and Samenow•s (1976) criminal thinking patterns are 
also other-directed and are linked to feeling states. 
This explains the cross-fertilization of ideas between 
nee-dynamic theories of psychopathy and related 
cognitive-behavioral theories (Meloy & Gacono, 1988) . 
Meloy posited that psychopaths never achieve 
object constancy, the bedrock of socialization, and 
that their need for normal attachment is deactivated. 
Instead, he hypothesized that psychopaths identify with 
what they perceive as an aggressive parent. They view 
their parents as the enemy and internalize what 
Grotstein (1982) called the stranger self-object. This 
fantasy of a predator that the infant introjects is 
what he or she will eventually become (Meloy, 1988). 
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Like the narcissist, the )Sychopath is conceived 
as having moved beyond borderline object relatior.s: 
the sense of "I" and "not-I" is intact. "The manner in 
which self and its relation to others is conceived, 
however, is distorted and exaggerated, reflecting the 
fusion of self- and object concepts" (Meloy, 1988, p. 
51). 
Meloy added that psychopathy •predisposes, 
precipitates, and perpetuates the expression of 
predatory violence" (p. 191). He distinguished between 
predatory and affective aggression. The forrner is 
characterized by decreased autonomic arousal and lack 
of affect, the later by incense sympathetic arousal. 
The object relations extensions of psychoanalytic 
theory do not repudiate earlier constructs. Meloy also 
described superego deficits in psychopaths. He used 
Kernberg's levels of superego pathology as diagnostic 
of the severity of psychopathy (Kernberg, 1984). 
Severe psychopaths •will verbalize full knowledge of 
the moral requirements of society, but do not 
understand what it means to internalize such standards" 
(Meloy, 1988, p. 313). 
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Antisocial Personality Disorder 
The term Antisocial Personality Disorder is the 
current nomenclature of the American Psychiatric 
Association's Diaanostic and Statistical Manual (1987). 
APD was adopted in 1968 with DSM-II (see Table 14). 
Like all DSM categories, the diagnosis of APD is 
given by matching the person to a list of behavioral 
descriptors. In general, DSM-III-R assigns somebody to 
a discrete category. It was not specifically designed 
to describe the person's current thought patterns, 
emotional processes, or psychodynamics. Also, APD is a 
much broader term than psychopathy. Reid, Dorr, 
Walker, and Bonner (1986) noted that 78% of all 
incarcerated felons could be diagnosed with APD. 
The way APO differs from criminality and 
psychopathy is illustrative of the nosological 
differences between psychological and psychiatric 
assessment in general. Hare (1970) believed that 
because discrete diagnostic categories (like APD) 
require exact assignment into one and only one 
diagnosis, they are more difficult to support than 
dimensional conceptualizat~ons like psychopathy. 
Eysenck (1986) concurred. He believed that the current 
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DSM categories abandoned validity to achieve diagnostic 
consensus (i.e., interrater reliability). 
Table 14 
Synopsis of Diacrnostic Criteria for APD 
Pre-morbid Prerequisite: 
Eighteen years of age or older and previous diagnosis 
of Conduct Disorder. 
An Ar.tisodal Lifesty\f;. characterized by (4+) : 
1. !nconsister..t work behavior 
2. Dis::egard for socier.al norms of legal behavior 
3. Assaultiveness 
4. Failure to honor financial obligations 
5. Failure to plan ahead or vagrancy 
6. Lying, aliases and conning 
7. Recklessness and disregard for safety 
8. Disregard of parental responsibilities 
9. Lack of monogamous relationship for one year 
10. Lack of remorse for injury to others 
Not Due to Psychotic Disorder; 
This antisocial behavior not due to Schizophrenia or 
Manic episodes. 
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The dimensional view, or psychological view, 
describes traits as they exist on a continuum (Eysenck 
& Gudjonsson, 1989). The question is, "How much of 
this characteristic is present and what other traits 
are present with it?• Whereas the question in the DSM 
is, "What discrete disease entity is present?• 
Millon believed that even discrepancies in 
theoretical approaches will lead to breakthroughs in 
classification. In Toward a New Personology, he 
provided some historical perspective: "For the most 
part, traditional nosologies were the product of a 
slowly evolving accretion of clinical experience, 
fostered and font'.alized by the systemizing efforts of 
respected clinician-scholars such as Kraepelin (1899)" 
(1990, p. 102). 
Millon believed that the adoption of his view of 
personality disorders is a great advance. He equated 
this with scientific progress. Millon and Klerrnan, in 
Contemporary Directions in Psychooathology: Toward the 
DSM-IV, wrote: 
A change in the character of psychopathology has 
begun to evolve in the past decade. Slow though 
progress may be, there are inexorable signs that 
the study of mental disorders has advanced beyond 
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longer dependent on the intuitive artistry of 
brilliant clinicians and theoreticians who 
formulated dazzling but unfalsifiable insights, 
psychopathology has acquired a solid footing in 
the empirical methodologies and quantitative 
techniques that characterize mature sciences. 
(1986, p. ix) 
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Others, like Hare, Hart, and Harpur (1991) had 
reservations about the direction that psychiatric 
classification is taking. Eysenck agreed: "There is 
little likelihood that the DSM-!V will show any 
improvement on the scientific procedures •JJhich have led 
to the scientifically disastrocs DSM-III" (1986, ?· 
74). 
In the DSM-IV Uodate, the American Psychiatric 
Association (1990) noted that Antisocial Personality 
Disorder will be the Axis II diagnostic catego:::y "most 
likely to undergo major changes" (p. 5). Multisite 
field trials are now under way (Hare, Hart, & Harpur, 
1991). 
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Criminal Personality; A Coqnitive-Behavioral Theory 
Directive, cognitive-behavioral treatment regimens 
are currently popular in criminal justice settings 
(Weinstock, 1990). Stanton Samenow wrote: 
Despite a multitude of differences in their 
backgrounds and crime patterns, criminals are 
alike in one way: how they think. A gun-toting, 
uneducated criminal off the streets of southeast 
Washington, D.C., and a crooked Georgetown 
business executive are extremely similar in their 
view of themselves and the world. (1984, p. 20) 
Yochelson and Samenow (1976) argued that criminals 
think differently from normal people. As a group, they 
are characterized by inaccurate thinking. Yochelson 
and Samenow believed that the most important difference 
between a criminal and a noncriminal is his/her 
distorted cognitive process. 
Orling (1991) has recently developed the 
Cognitive-Style Questionnaire (CSQJ to operationalize 
Yochelson and Samenow's theory of distorted criminal 
thinking. The CSQ is a 289-item, Likert-scaled 
instrument. 
Yochelson and Samenow•s writings have been 
critiqued as being full of hyperbole and overstatement 
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(Weinstock, 1990) . Sometimes their work sounds like a 
diatribe against criminals. 
Like the work of Cleckley, this is a case-study 
oriented approach. However, some research is now being 
conducted to test the Yochelson and Samenow hypothesis 
(Thaler, 1991; Walters, 1990). Following is a 
representative list of criminal personality 
distinctives. 
Energy 
Yochelson and Samenow noted that the criminal is 
extremely energetic, both physically and mentally. 
They hypothesized that this activity is not just random 
rr.ania but, instead, is purposeful and goal directed. 
Yochelson and Sarnenow contended that this excitability 
is not due to a neurological deficit, but :i.s under the 
criminal's conscious control to "make life more 
interesting and exciting" (1976, p. 256). 
Fear 
The criminal is afraid primarily of two things: 
physical injury and injury to his or her self-esteem. 
Yochelson and Sarnenow (1976) believed that these fears 
are unlike neurotic fears or simple phobias in that the 
criminal does not admit them. 
Corrosion and eutoff 
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Criminals do have methods for modulating their 
fear and other negative affects. They can use 
•corrosion• and •cut-off." Corrosion is gradual, and 
cutoff is nearly instantaneous. Both are alike, 
however, because both methods are used by criminals to 
talk themselves out of being afraid and into committing 
a crime. 
Corrosion, according to Yochelson and Samenow, is 
a gradual, conscious desensitization process that 
criminals use to reduce the fear that could deter them 
from committing a crime. Walters (1990) called this 
same process mollification. To mollify (or corrode) 
their consciences, offenders utilize any and all 
methods and devices to gradually rationalize their 
crimes or at least to mitigate against responsibility. 
Sometimes the victim or society is blamed. Other 
times the crime is minimized out of existence. Walters 
cited Dobson's (1989) interview of serial killer Ted 
Bundy and noted: 
Bundy refers, not once, but twice, to the women he 
"has harmed," which seems a gargantuan 
understatement in light of the fact that he 
sexually abused, killed, and mutilated nearly all 
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of his victims. In summary, mollification entails 
an effort by the lifestyle criminal to assuage, 
exonerate or extenuate responsibility for his 
violent and antisocial activities, which may or 
may not be true, but which have nothing to do with 
the individual's own behavior. (1990, p. 133) 
Cutoff is used for the same purpose, but is 
invoked almost instantaneously. This fear cutoff 
mechanism is, like corrosion, hypothesized to be under 
the offender's volitional control. Oftentimes, a 
particular piece of profanity is used to trigger a 
cutoff (Walters, 1990; Yochelson & Samenow, 19i5). 
Even though cutoff is so rapid and automatic, it is 
hypothesized to be a habit under. the criminal's 
control. 
~ 
This is conunon to all hwnans, but Yochelson and 
Samenow wrote about a severe variant that results in 
criminality. They posited that unlike anger in normal, 
responsible people, the criminal's anger •metastasizes" 
(1976, pp. 268-269). It escalates naturally when the 
criminal's desires are blocked and results in acting-
out behavior. This anger is not globally directed 
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frustrate the criminal's wishes. 
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This is not the sa.~e as feeling good about a job 
well done. In contrast, criminal pride •corresponds to 
an extremely and inflexibly high evaluation of oneself 
[it] is rigid in that it preserves a self-created 
image of a powerful, totally self-detennining person• 
(Yochelson & Samenow, 1976, pp. 274-275). This 
rigidity is maintained in order to prevent the 
encroachment of the feared zero state.25 
Criminals often are self-aggrandizing to the point 
of ridiculousness and megalomania. They :nay attempt 
superhwran feats which result in severe injury. Others 
have been known to become professional impostors. For 
example, Waldo Demara successfully posed as a 
psychologist, a philosophy professor, a surgeon, a 
prison guard, and a minister (Coleman, Butcher, & 
Carson, 1984). 
25 Zero state is conceptualized as a feeling of low self-esteem 
and abandonment. This may be a common factor in Personality 
Disorders (Kernberg, 1984). 
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Power Thrust;. 
The "power thrust" (Yochelson & Samenow, 1976) is 
the criminal' .s maladaptive response to compensate for 
the zero state. In a power thrust, a criminal acts out 
his or her fantasy of pride or omnipotence, usually in 
an interpersonal situation. It is an attempt to undo 
the zero state and reestablish an acceptable self-
image. 
When criminals use the power thrust as a coping 
response, they are displaying two thinking errors. 
First, they are overcompensating ~y replacing thocghcs 
and feelings cf worthlessness with ~nbridled 
grandiosity. Second, they are usually ex."libiting 
callous disregard for others. Yochelson and Samenow 
conceived of this criminal will-to-power as a narcotic; 
it is the only antidote to the criminal's empty self.26 
•criminals crave power for its own sake, and they 
will do virtually anything to acquire it. Insatiable 
in their thirst for power and unprincipled in their 
exercise of it, they care very little whom they injure 
or destroy• (Samenow, 1984, p. 98). 
26 The view of evil as pride can be seen in Schuster (1987) and 
Peck (1983), as well as in the theology of Strong (1899). 
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All criminal behavior is by nature exploitive and 
manipulative and, hence, a power thrust, according to 
Yochelscn and Samenow. Sexually controlling behavior 
is one power thrust exa.~ple they noted (1976). Another 
class of power thrusts proposed are those of speech. 
Criminals of ten misuse polysyllabic words to make 
themselves seem more intelligent, or "if his usage is 
correct, it is often pretentious. The criminal may use 
flowery language to appear suave and debonair" 
(Yochelson & Samenow, 1976, p. 280). 
Walters (1990) noted that the criminal's tendency 
to oscillate between the power thrust and the zero 
state is a form of cognitive rigidity that one would 
expect to find in an adolescent. 
The repeat offender has resisted the societal push 
for increased self-discipline through responsible, 
internalized action and remains at a point in his 
development where external control and influence 
are viewed as predominant. Consequently, the 
world view of most criminals is inunature, 
unsophisticated, and largely fatuous in that it 
focuses on a solitary dimension of human 
experience (strong versus weak). (1990, p. 139) 
Sentimentality 
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This is described as "the Robin Hood syndrome" or 
the •one helluva fella" fallacy by Walters (1990). 
Sentimentality is the criminal's tendency to allege 
soft-heartedness, aesthetic interest, or a certain 
circumscribed morality. 
In prison, certain crimes (e.g., rape, child 
molestati~n, and being an informant} are taboo even to 
the most hardened convict. Also, even violent 
offenders exhibit a soft spot. Yochelson and Sarnenow 
noted that criminals retain these lacunae in their 
criminality in orde= ~o be able to say that they are 
basically a nice person. 
Ted Bundy, in his pre-execution interview with 
Dobson portrays himself as the normal "guy next door": 
Basically I was a normal person. I wasn't some 
guy hanging out at bars or I wasn't a pervert. I 
was essentially a normal person. I had good 
friends; I lived a normal life; I wasn't perfect 
but, I want to be quite candid with you, I was 
okay. Okay I was. (Dobson, 1989) 
Dobson was professionally interested in Bundy in 
order to document the role pornography played as a 
causal factor in the genesis of a serial killer 
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(Dobson, 1989). Walters believed that Bundy's agenda 
was to provide that information in order to exonerate 
himself by shifting the blame to an outside agent 
(i.e., the obscene material). Walters concluded that 
Bundy's goal was to take Dr. Dobson on a •sentimental 
journey• (1990, p. 143). 
Religion 
Yochelson and Samenow (1976) described a 
religiosity that is in service of an offender's 
criminal intent. Allport's (1950) research described a 
religious orientation that can be either extrinsic 
(directed toward some other, ulterior motive) or 
intrinsic, the converse. The criminal/religious factor 
that Yochelson and Samenow described appears to conform 
with Allport's extrinsic religious orientation. 
Yochelson and Samenow believed that for criminals, 
their religion "has not evolved beyond their childhood 
forms,• and "the criminal lacks the concept of religion 
as a way of life or as an ethical system. He believes 
that a few concrete acts . . make him a religious 
person• (1976, p. 294). A criminal merely uses his or 
her religion as a way to atone for previous offenses. 
At the same time, he or she is planning new ones. This 
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religiou~ behavior may actually take on the form of a 
"monastic phase" (1976, p. 299). 
Evil Inherent in Severe Criminality 
Attribution of Evil Implicit in the Four Theories 
The theories exposited above all point to the evil 
inherent in criminality. Samenow•s theory is the most 
open about its value judgments, but each of these four 
paradigms ascribes evil to criminals. 
Under a section titled, "Hatred and the Wish to 
Destroy,• Meley wrote that psychopaths •may hate 
goodne;:;s itself" (1938, p. J31). Burn::iut is said to be 
common a..~ongst therapists treating psychopaths because 
of extreme countertransf erence issues (Weinstock, 
1990). Kernberg (1984) described the psychopath's 
rralignant narcissism. Meloy (1988) detailed the 
problerr~ treating them: therapists are to expect 
sadism, manipulation, devaluation, denial, and 
deception. To this he added that real fear of assault 
exists concomitantly with the intense negative 
countertransference. He also noted that this 
countertransference is neither to be ignored nor 
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analyzed away. It should be heeded. The evil inherent 
in psychopathy is dangerous. 
Hare's (1980) version of psychopathy also ascribes 
evil to psychopaths. The PCL describes them as 
irresponsible, deceitful, re.~orseless, arrogant, and 
promiscuous, for example. 
APO criteria are lying, remorselessness, parental 
irresponsibility, destruction of others' property, 
forcing sexual activities on others, physical cruelty 
tp animals and persons, and using weapons against 
others as indicators of the disorder (APA, 1987) . 
These behaviors are indicators of moral failure cross-
culturally (Lewis, 1947) . 
Meloy (1988) claimed to defer any moral or 
philosophical judgment on the aggressive behavior of 
psychopaths. He did suggest it as a topic for further 
research, however. 
Attempting to construct a positivist psychology of 
crime is vain. Insofar as it succeeds, it will only 
produce theories which do not admit value judgments and 
are inadequate to explain the richness (and the 
depravity) of human behavior. 
Criminals behave differently from noncriminals. 
The theorists above admit that sometimes criminal 
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behavior is overtly evil. To clearly describe this 
criminal behavior, the language of moral judgment must 
be retained. 
Criminal Human Nature 
Some psychologists (as well as some of the lay 
public) opine that criminals are altogether 
(qualitatively) different from normals. Others, like 
federal prison psychologist Walters (1990), contend 
that everyone commits some crimes; criminality is a 
question of degree. Stanton Sa.T.er.ow disagreed: 
Those who hold such a view go a step further, 
asserting thac we are all, in a sense, criminals 
because we lie, lust and yield to temptation, but 
it is absurd to equate the white lie of the 
responsible person with the gigantic network of 
lies of the criminal. At some point we and 
the criminal are very different. He is far more 
extreme in that crime is a way of life, not an 
occasional aberration. It is misleading to claim 
that the criminal wants what the responsible 
person wants. (1984, p. 21) 
The question of whether all people are incipient 
criminals or whether criminals are categorically 
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different from noncriminals seems insoluble from the 
extant psychological data alone. Hall noted that "some 
of the ablest people have been the greatest criminals" 
(1945, p. 364) . The quasi-psychological status of 
criminality necessitates a broader inquiry to answer 
this dilemma. Therefore, the existence of evil will 
now be considered more thoroughly. 
The Existence and Proximity of Evil 
The existence of evil may be readily apparent in 
other persons, while at the same time defense 
mechanisms may obscure one's personal responsibility 
(Freud, 1939/1990) . Emil Brunner (1950) noted that the 
warp in humanity's understanding of a phenomenon may be 
a moral problem. He called this the rule of proximity. 
In brief, Christian anthropologists view hwnans as 
having been created in the image of God, but that 
hwnankind fell from that pristine state. In this 
context Erickson explained the rule of proximity: 
This is the idea that the effect of the fall upon 
creation and upon perception of the truth is 
greatest in those areas where the relationship 
between God and hwnans is most directly :Lnvolved, 
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and least where that relationship is not at all in 
view. (1991, p. 540) 
This principle explains another key difference between 
the natural and hurran sciences described in chapter 2. 
The human sciences may be contaminated by personal 
blind spots. The view that humanity is fundamentally 
good or evil may be a projection of the investigator's 
self-concept. If humankind is prone to evil, then the 
researcher may need to confront her own personal 
immorality. 
The Inadegq~Q.f..£.QD.t.err.J;l_oraJ;·v ScieJll;;.,if i c 
An!;;h;r...QR.Q]. ca i es 
Nontheological views of hurran nature exhibit 
serious shortcomings. Saucy (1993) noted that while 
naturalistic anthropologies may be able to account for 
variety, they have no mechanism to account for 
individual personality. This makes the psychological 
study of the individual self impossible. 
Also, Reinhold Niebuhr (1941) demonstrated that 
nontheistic anthropologies cannot deal with the issue 
of hurran transcendence over nature. Even when a person 
describes himself as part of the natural world, there 
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must be a part left out (one's self) to do the 
explaining.27 
A survey 9t the concepts of Christian anthropology 
germane to the psychology of criminality is included in 
the next section. Creation, the fall, human freedom, 
and conscience are discussed. 
C=eation in the Image of Gqd 
Riccur (1967) noted that the story of Adam in the 
Garden of Eden is superivr to other ancient creation 
accounts. This is because it accounts for evil as 
real, it dispenses with ambiguous dualistic notions of 
evil, and it links evil to human responsibility. 
The Bible states that Adam was created in the 
image (tseleml and likeness (deJIT'Jth) of God (Genesis 
1:27). This image was not a donum superadditum, an 
added gift, but was inherent in the original creation. 
Martin Luther (1958) noted the terms image and likeness 
are not different, but are a form of Hebrew 
parallelism. Calvin (1536/1990) added that the image 
is still present in humanity; it is only marred. 
27 For a critique of Niebuhr's views, see Carl Rogers (1962). 
Klooster (1964) analyzed Niebuhr's existentialism, i.e., that sin 
is equal to finiteness. 
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Some expositors view the image of God as being 
explicit in the near context (in Genesis l and 2). 
They believe, for instance, that Adam and Eve were 
created to be creative or that the image occurs in 
their maleness and femaleness (Barth, 1962). Although 
Barth's gender interpretation may be far-fetched 
(Gerstner, 1962), the interpersonal implications of 
creation in the image of a triune God are 
inescapable.28 Others see that participation in the 
Imago Pei means that hurrankind is like God in more 
general ways, perhaps as an intellecting being 
(Aquinas, 1990). 
The idea of personhood, as currently construed in 
Western thought, owes its existence to Christian 
theology (Erickson, 1991) . The debates about the 
personhood of Christ provided the vocabulary and the 
concepts which made the elevation of the individual 
person possible (Pannenberg, 1977). 
The implication of the image of God in humanity 
is, first and foremost, that people were designed by 
God and are of great value. Second, "the image is the 
28 The interpersonal (trinitarian?) nature of personality is 
evident in many diverse psychological theories (White, 1961) . 
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powers of personality which make man, like God, a being 
capable of interacting with other persons, of thinking 
and reflecting, and of willing freely" (Erickson, 1985, 
p. 513). 
Also, creation in the image and likeness of God 
implies that the human race is responsible to God the 
Law Giver. Implicit is a universal standard of right 
and wrong as part and parcel of human nature. 
The precepts of the natural moral law must be the 
same for all human beings, everywhere and at all 
times, if they are inherent in human nature and 
discoverable by our understanding of what is 
really good and right for human beings to seek and 
to do. This is tantamount to asserting that there 
is only one sound, moral philosophy, one that 
directs each of us in leading morally good lives 
regardless of our individual and cultural 
differences. I am willing to make that assertion 
without hesitation. . . . There cannot be a 
plurality of incompatible moral doctrines all 
prescriptively true. (Lewis, 1947, p. 87)29 
29 Lewis (1947) also presented evidence for the agreement of moral 
codes, which he called the Tao. 
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The doctrine of creation implies human purpose, 
the possibility of wholeness, and a real right and 
wrong. God is the designer or formal cause of the 
individual person. 
Tbe Fall as an Explanation of Evil 
Evolutionary expositions of evil, like the process 
theology of Teilhard de Chardin (1955), describe evil 
as the necessary byproduct of progress. Thus, process 
thought redefines evil as only apparently bad (Alsford, 
1991). First, this is pantheism (or panentheism) with 
its attendant difficulties (Geisler, 1976). Second, it 
trivializes suffering and dces not coincide with what 
most people mean by evil. 
Some versions cf Irenaean theodicy ~ay also be 
critiqued from this perspective. John Hick (1977) 
described evil as the necessary byproduct of "soul-
making. • C. S. Lewis (1970b) emphasized the Irenaean 
approach in The Problem of Pain.30 
The Augustinian view of evil "shares with the 
!renaean an emphasis on human-freedom and 
30 Wilson (1990) reported the reaction of Lewis• colleagues at 
Oxford. Lewis' argument exposed the inconsistency of those who 
expect God to correct all evil consequences in real time. 
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responsibility, but sees the imperfections and evils of 
creation as a result of, not a prerequisite of, such 
freedom and responsibility" (Alsford, 1991, p. 124) .31 
Paul's doctrine of the Old Man in Romans 6-7 
illuminates the personal dimension of human evil. In 
contrast to the myth of human perfectibility offered by 
positivist criminology, the Bible affirms that humanity 
is fallen into sin (Romans 7:14). Paul affirms that 
humankind is radically affected by sin, that the 
natural state of hu..'Tian affairs (the flesh) can do 
nothing but serve the law of sin (Romans 7:25). 
This is the doctrine of total depravity that was 
emphasized by Calvin (1536/1990) . Total depravity does 
not mean that everyone is as bad as he or she might be 
but that every facet of human nature is touched by sin. 
In order to understand humanity most completely, 
endemic evil cannot be ignored. 
Human Freedom 
The freedom and responsibility necessitated by the 
fall are denied by many psychological determinists from 
31 For a historical critique of the development of Augustine's 
view of evil, with special reference to his view of sex as evil, 
see Pagels (1988) . 
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divergent schools of thought. In Wisdom and Humann~ss 
in Psychology, Evans (1989) noted that the Christian 
view of freedom is intellectually defensible.32 He 
critiqued the reign of event causality (the view that 
everything is caused by a previous event) and defended 
the idea of agent causality33 (the view that persons 
can be causes) . 
Agent causality provides an escape from 
determinism. While novel to some, it is implicit in 
the Bible. God, a personal agent Himself, is sovereign 
over all events, but Ee sovereignly decreed that human 
Deings have actual responsibility (Brunner, 1950; 
Edwards, 1992; Reid, 1983) .34 This Christian view of 
actual moral responsibility is still extant in 
jurisprudence, but, interestingly, has been largely 
32 Libertarianism (unrelated to the political movement) 
(Plantinga, 1990) . 
33 This is equivalent to Aristotle's efficient cause cited above 
and corresponds to the shoemake= e~.a:nple. 
34 Brunner's view of God' a sovereignty and hu:nan responsibility 
clarifies the Reformed view. See especially his historical 
account of how Calvin and Zwingli fell prey to the natural 
theology they dreaded (1950, pp. 303-353). 
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banished from the other social sciences (Montgomery, 
1975). 
The Conscience 
The Bible provides data for science but is not a 
science textbook (Brunner, 1950; Morris, 1984). This 
conclusion applies to the science of theology as well. 
The Bible does not set forth an explicit, systematic 
anthropology. For instance, it often does not use 
anthropological terms, like soul, spirit, or 
conscience, in a technical sense (Gundry, 1987; Jewett, 
1971). 
Most Christian theologians have assumed, however, 
that this nomenclature does describe a real, 
substantive, but immaterial part of human nature 
(Aquinas, 1990; Moreland, 1993). Some theologians have 
attempted in recent years to reduce humanity to a 
completely physical entity (Meyers, 1978). This may in 
part be a result of the theological trend to 
dehellenize the New Testament in the last hundred years 
to move it towards naturalistic monism (von Harnack, 
1901/1958). 
Data from current cognitive science support mind 
as distinct from matter as well. R. w. Sperry 
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(1983),35 the neuropsychologist known for his 
conunissurotomy studies, and Sir John Eccles (1984a, 
l984bl, the Nobel prize-winning brain scientist, both 
believe that their data imply mind/body dualism. 
A full treatment of the mind-body problem is 
outside the scope of this study.36 However, the Bible 
does provide substantial information al:out these 
constructs (Issler, 1993). 
The Dible pictures the conscience not as an innate 
moral code but as a God-given conscious sensitivity to 
be consulted. 
35 
7o repeatedly ignore the promptings of conscience 
will des~usitize the conscience's pro~pcings 
regarding a given conviction. As blind persons 
regularly use sandpaper to keep their fingertips 
sensitive for reading braille, so those who wish 
to pursue righteousness must be ever alert to the 
Sperry is actually an epiphencmenalist, the view that a real 
mind supervenes over matter. 
36 See Body. Soul and Life Everlasting, (Cooper, 1989) for a 
discussion of biblical and rabbinic views of the soul, and see 
also Moreland' a (1993) criticism of epiphenominalism. 
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promptings of conscience. (Issler, 1993, pp. 268· 
269) 
The dysfunctional conscience may be weak (1 
Corinthians 8). Or it may be seared (1 Timothy 4:2), 
that is, deadened.37 Immanuel Kant, in a classic 
passage, explained to have no conscience is impossible: 
When, therefore, it is said, "This man has no 
conscience,• what is meant is that he pays no heed 
to its dictates. For if he really had none, he 
would not take credit to himself for anything done 
according to duty. . . . Unconscientiousness is 
not a want of conscience, but the propensity not 
to heed its judgment .•. The duty here is only 
to cultivate our conscience, to quicken our 
attention to the voice of the internal judge, and 
to use all means to secure obedience to it. (1990, 
p. 375) (see also Appendix DJ 
A clear view of the conscience is essential to 
understanding its function in normal persons. This is 
37 See (Hendriksen, 1979) on 1 Timochy 4:2. See also F. F. Bruce 
,,,. " .. ,,,. "· ( 1984, pp. 353 • 356) on ic&ica.unip1a.crµEvoov "t"T\V 10ta.v cruvE1011cnv, che 
cauterized conscience. 
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true a fortiori in understanding the dysfunctional 
conscience of the psychopath or other severe criminals. 
Criminology Explained Scientifically 
by Psychology and Theology 
Christian theology and clear thinking help clarify 
the theoretical issues surrounding the etiology of 
severe criminality. First, psychologists should 
realize that criminality is a quasi-psychological 
phenomenon. Crime needs to be understood 
psychologically, but br~ader perspectives on 
criminality will add to, not detract from, 
understandin3 crime. 
Borrowing Aristocelian and Hippocratic language, 
would-be criminals have various predisposing factors 
(diatheses) that may incline them to criminality. 
These factors (i.e., material causes) may, in part, be 
the results of sins against them; that is, they may be 
the victims of child abuse or sociocultural 
deprivation. These predispositions may even be 
genetic. 
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Criminals are still moral agents, however. As 
such, they are the efficient cause that actualizes 
their criminality. 
Because all persons are created in the image of 
God (the design plan, or formal cause), they are 
created to be righteous. They retain that image even 
in their fallen state and, hence, ought to be able to 
act in accordance with that design. Even now, they can 
heed their consciences and receive the input necessary 
to modify their behavior. 
This means that their behavior is purposive. The 
final cause of criminal behavior is that criminals 
believe that cri.xr.e will achieve some goal. A return to 
the classical view of causality with its volitional 
implications makes psychological intervention possible. 
CHAPTER 4 
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PRAXIS: INTERVENTION IN FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 
This chapter is built on the conclusions of the 
two previous chapters. Namely, that current advances 
in the philosophy of science and the nature of science 
allow for the scientific discussion of evil 
concurrently with the scientific study of criminality. 
This is the meta-theoretical foundation of this study. 
As shewn, crime and evil ought to be invest:igated 
simultaneously in order to best understand criminal 
human nature. The Christian view of hti!!'an nature was 
introduced. 111e nature of etiology, conscience, and 
freedom were discussed alongside current descriptions 
of criminality. The argument advanced was that this 
expanded theory of human nature better describes 
criminal phenomena because it better describes human 
nature. 
This section will move beyond theory to praxis. 
The crime and evil construct will be used to examine 
current issues in the psychotherapy and general 
amelioration of severe criminality. 
Therapeutic Nihilism 
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Meloy (1988) described an oral tradition that 
antisocial personalities are untreatable. As noted 
above, pronounced negative countertransference toward 
severe criminals is likely. The converse is also 
possible: some therapists believe that a therapeutic 
alliance exists when none is present. Therapists may 
also be seduced by the lurid details of the crime or by 
the infamy of the patient. •consultation or 
supervision is highly recommended" (Reid, 1986, p. 
257). 
Antisocial personalities are difficult to treat. 
Like other personality disorders, the course of 
treatment will be long, no matter what techniques are 
used (Freeman & Leaf, 1989; Prins, 1986). 
Gunderson noted several reasons for treatment 
failure. These include the APD patient's •tendency to 
explain and discharge affects externally" and a 
"distrust for authority• (1988, p. 347) . Mcconaghy 
(1989), a behaviorist, treated psychopathic patients 
but noted that they cannot be trusted either to 
continue in therapy or to make accurate self-reports. 
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Conversely, Prins (1986) warned that the term 
psychopathy can become a derogatory term, a kind of 
psychological name-calling. Terminology like 
antisocial personality or psychopathy can become a 
"dustbin" category, to which we have assigned all 
those patients, residents, inmates, and offenders 
who seem unwilling to be helped, are 
unpredictable, unresponsive, and who, in addition, 
may show aggressive behavior to a severe degree. 
There is, of course, much truth in this, but it is 
only a partial explanaticn. (p. 158) 
Mental health professionals are likely to 
experience a whole range of emotions while treating 
severe criminals. They may choose not to treat them at 
all and apply their limited time and resources to 
treating other patients (Gunderson, 1988). This may be 
due to the pervasive opinion that •nothing works" in 
treating criminals (Martinson, 1974). 
Recidivism and cure 
Recidivism rates for incarcerated of fenders are 
high. No single, accurate rearrest rate for either 
treated or untreated criminals is agreed upon, however 
(Diiulio, 1991) . 
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Comparisons across studies are difficult. 
Different investigators use different definitions of 
recidivism. Sometimes recidivism means cow.mitting the 
same offense; sometimes it means any new conviction. 
Or, a parolee may be returned to prison for an 
infraction that is not a crime for a citizen not under 
court supervision. 
This matter is further complicated for 
psychologists because most offenses are not detected, 
many detected offenses do not lead to arrest, many 
arrestees are not tried, and many of those tried are 
not convicted. Also, even convicted reoffenders may 
plead guilty to a lesser charge, making them appear to 
have desisted their serious offending. 
In short, recidivism is not equal to psychological 
relapse. Therefore, any measured reduction of criminal 
behavior based on recidivism rates may be spoiled data 
(Diiulio, 1991; Megaree, 1982) . 
One conclusion of the longitudinal Cambridge-
Somerville youth study was that young offenders 
receiving treatment actually became worse than the 
control group (McCord & McCord, 1964). Martinson 
(1974) studied 231 treatment programs and concluded 
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that •nothing works.• Since then the efficacy of the 
psychological treatment is suspect.38 
Success rates for therapy in the community may noc 
be much better. Garfield and Bergin (1986) noted a 
•rule of thirds• to describe therapy outcome. One 
third of clients get better even without treatment, one 
third improve with treatment, and one third get worse 
with treatment. If the Garfield and Bergin iatrogenic 
heuristic applies to forensic therapy, that could mean 
that thousands of psychopaths are being made worse by 
forensic treatment. 
Some treatmen~ successes with criminals are 
reported. Ross and Fabiano (1985) performed a detailed 
analysis of successful and unsuccessful treatment 
programs with offenders. They argued that criminality 
is related to delayed or impaired cognition (see Table 
15). 
38 Some treatments may work, the effects may just be immeasurable 
because of the confounding nature of recidivism. "Nothing works" 
sounds more dramatic than •retaining the null hypothesis." 
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Outcome of Treatment in Inmate Proqrams With and 
Without Cognitiv@ Components 
QJ.lt!:;QID~ ~Qgnitiv~ NQll!::Qqllitivsi 
Tr~stm~nt T~eatment 
Effective 15 (94\) 10 (29%') 
Ineffective l (6%) 24 (71%') 
Total Studies 16 (100%) 34 (100%) 
x2 .. 18.02, df "' 1, p < .001 
They contend that interventions that decrease 
recidivism39 address the criminal's disability with 
interpersonal problem solving, critical reasoning, 
meta-cognition, reflection, and values. 
120 
The directive and confrontative factor in 
cognitive therapy may be the effective element in these 
therapies _(Dryden & Ellis, 1988). Samenow (1984) 
directly challenged inmates to change their selfish 
39 An alternative explanation to these data would be that 
successful (i.e., cognitive) therapy makes for more stealthy 
criminals. 
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thinking. Glasser (1965) also reported success with 
his directive Reality Therapy at the Ventura School for 
Girls. 
Cognitive and cognitive-behavioral therapies often 
strive for narrow and circumscribed outcomes. Thaler 
(1991) listed the reduction of anger arousal, 
threatening behavior, and anxiety, as well as the 
increase of assertiveness as successful outcome targets 
in criminal populations. These are beneficial goals, 
but they are certainly less ambitious than curing 
psychopathy o::- eliminating ~riminality. 
Reid ( 19 86) reported several di versicnary progra.rr.s 
such as con"llr.unity-based corrections and wild.;:rness 
experiences as being successful treatment for 
antisocial personality. Criminals in these programs 
are likely to be less serious offenders, however 
(Umbreit, 1985). Hence, the prevalence of APD or 
psychopathy in these groups is likely to be rather low. 
The Ethics of Treatment and Punishment 
Clinical psychologists working in forensic 
settings are responsible to the patient, to society, 
and to their profession (Sales, 1983). They are paid 
by the state, however. Also, therapeutic ideals yield 
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to custodial concerns, confidentiality is limited, and 
dual relationships abound. The most extreme example 
may be when a psychologist is called upon to treat a 
client to restore competency for execution (Megaree, 
1982). 
Weinstock (1990) reported another ethical concern. 
He stated that recidivism rates might be lowered in a 
way that runs counter to the values of a democratic 
society and professional ethics. Indeterminate 
sentencing, that is keeping inmates incarcerated until 
they meet therapeutic standards, has been reported to 
lower recidivism rates. Lewis elaborated: 
The things done to the criminal, even if they are 
called cures, will be just as compulsory as they 
were in the old days when we called them 
punishments. If a tendency to steal can be cured 
by psychotherapy, the thief will no doubt be 
forced to undergo the treatment. (Lewis, l970a, p. 
288) 
Psychologists ought not allow their therapy to be 
substituted for punishment just as psychiatrists cannot 
ethically prescribe medication to punish (Toch & Adams, 
1989). Ethically speaking, aversive therapy requires 
informed consent (Mcconaghy, 1989). 
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This ethical problem results from a subordinate 
view of humanity (Lewis, 1970a). If humans are created 
in the image of God and real good and evil exists, then 
they are responsible for their behavior (see chapter 
3). The enlightened or "humanitarian" view that 
considers all punishment as barbaric strips criminals 
of their dignity (House, 1991) . 
If the Christian view of humanity is lost, then 
psychologists are reduced to "official straighteners" 
{Lewis, 1970a, p. 290) . 
We dernand of a cure not whether it is just bu= 
whether it succeeds. Thus when we cease to 
consider what the criminal deserves and consider 
only what will cure him or deter others, we have 
tacitly removed him frora the sphere cf justice 
altogether; instead of a person, a subject of 
rights, we now have a mere object, a patient, a 
•case.• (Lewis, 1970a, p. 288) 
Practically speaking, the results are 
countertherapeutic as well. ~..a.king psychotherapy the 
final end, above the ideal of justice, reduces therapy 
to a charade. It will produce inmates who fake-good in 
order to be paroled (Diiulio, 1991). Furthermore, 
faking good might be the rational thing for them to do. 
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The decline of the idea of just deserts in 
forensic psychology leads to the decay of forensic 
psychology. This decline results from the removal of 
moral agency from the criminal justice equation. 
Psychologists ought not insulate themselves from ethics 
and justice. The socially responsible and ethical 
solution is to put the soul (psyche) back into 
psychology (White, 1987) . 
Restorative Forensic Psychology 
A medical model of psychopathology has benefits. 
Classifying human conditions helps explain 
commonalities in etiology and provides insights into 
remediation (Gunderson, 1988) . The medical model may 
be extended beyond its usefulness, however. Chuck 
Colson, president of Justice Fellowship (a prison 
reform movement) and Prison Fellowship (a prison 
ministry), described the confusion between evil 
behavior and psychopathology; he observed: 
During a recent trip to Europe, I met with a 
psychiatrist in a model correctional institution. 
She explained how 71 percent of the inmates there 
had been classified as mentally abnonnal, or 
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psychiatric cases, since they had committed 
particularly heinous crimes. Since people are 
inherently good, the doctor inferred, anyone who 
does evil must be mentally ill. So imr.ates with 
this "illness• were sent to her institution to be 
•cured." (Colson, 1990, p. 170) 
Fingarette (1988) noted a similar confusion in his 
study, Heayy Drinking. The bad habit, drinking 
excessively, has been transformed into an illness. He 
noted that this transformation is bad science and moral 
obscurantism. The "diseasing• of imrates or drunkards 
is cruel because it disables their ability to change. 
Instead, they m~st look for the right doctor with the 
latest cure. They then only need to wait passively 
while the cure is administered to them. 
The perceived contradiction between moral behavior 
and mental health may be a result of an oversimplified 
popularization of Freud's theory that the restraint of 
drives by moral oversight is •unhealthy.•40 Drives are 
4° Freud sometimes appears to hold this view. Other times he 
advocated moral restraint (see Civilization and Its Discontents 
[Freud, l929/l990] and the letters between Freud and Pastor Oskar 
Pfister [Freud & Pfistar, l963]). 
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seen as mechanistic forces that will be expressed one 
way or the other. The expression of drives is viewed 
as natural and healthy; the repression of drives is 
not. 41 
The discovery of psychological regularities does 
not mean psychological determinism. The restoration of 
mental and moral wholeness to serious offenders ought 
to be the goal of forensic psychology. 
Wholeness and Mental Hygiene 
In contradistinction to the view that health is 
equated with the discharge of instinctual drives, the 
Judeo-Christian Scriptures advance an alternative view 
of health. Luck (1972), writing in the Tbeological 
Dictionary of the New Testament, noted that health 
' ' (uytVTJS, from which "hygiene• is derived) means 
soundness or balance. He also described how the 
, I 
translators of the Septuagint used uytVTJS to translate 
shalom, the Hebrew word for peace. 
41 The deterministic view that disease causes behavior is 
problematic because it relies on simplistic notions of causality 
(see chapter 3) . 
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Umbreit (1985) adopted the word shalom (peace) to 
develop his model of criminal justice. Crimes are 
sometimes called a disturbance of the peace. Umbreit's 
Old Testament criminology is designed to restore the 
peace. 
Brown, Driver, and Briggs (1979) document that the 
Hebrew words for restitution and peace derive from the 
same root. Van Ness (1986) noted that under Hebrew law 
offenders were considered responsible for their 
actio~s. Therefore, they were required to pay back or 
recompense their victims. This fine (a response cost, 
in behavioral terms) was not paid to the state. In 
order to restore th~~ peace in the ccmmunity, the victim 
was paid restitution (Juscice Fellowship, 1989; Van 
Ness, 1996). 
"Response cost refers to the loss of a positive 
reinforcer• (Kazdin, 1989, p. 153). The most common 
response cost in everyday life is a traffic fine. 
Something positive the offender possesses (i.e., money) 
is taken from him or her. A synonym for response cost 
is negative punishment (Karoly, 1980) (see Table 16). 
Table 16 
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Response Cost in Relation to Other Behavioral 
Techniques 
froced11re ~Qngi!;;iQ!l ,.,...nc:Pmlenci:> Resyl!;; 
Positive Introducing Pleasant Increased 
Reinforcement !Behavior 
!Negative !Removing Unpleasant Increased 
IReinf orcement !Behavior 
Punishment Introducing Unpleasant IDecreased 
Behavior 
!Response Cost 'Removing Pleasant :Oecreased 
Behavior 
Olinger and Epstein (1991) have argued that 
response cost paradigms have been successful for 
treating adolescent aggressive behavior in 
institutional settings. Sandler (1980) reported that 
using overcorrection combined with response cost 
quickly reduced institutional theft. 
overcorrection is also found in biblical response 
cost/restitution paradigms. Old Testament offenders 
were required to pay back several times the amount 
stolen (Urnbreit, 1985). In fact, the primary 
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difference between behavioral response cost and 
biblical restitution is that restitution specifies that 
the fine be paid to the victim. 
Restitution was a component of other ancient near 
eastern law codes and suzerainty treaties (Archer, 
1975; Johnson, 1987). Johnson described the Hebrew 
view of humanity represented in the Pentateuch; he 
argued that the Hebrew view incorporated an elevated 
anthropology compared to surrounding cultures. For 
instance, in ancient Israel capital punishment was not 
required for property crimes because htanankind was 
created in the image of God. 
House (199~) docurr.ented the shift from paying back 
the victim to •paying your debt to society." King 
Henrf, the son of William the Conqueror, referred to 
the peace in his realm as the king's peace. Any 
offense to one's neighbor was now an offense against 
the crown. Under English common law and now in the 
United States, a crime is a grievance against the 
state. This is seen in the language of legal dockets 
that describe cases as "The State v. John Doe." The 
current victim's rights movement is an attempt to 
balance this view (Sank & Caplan, 1991). 
Crime and Evil 
130 
Umbreit (1985) noted that contrary to public 
perception, in his state, 38% of all prison inmates are 
inca~cerated for nonviolent property offenses. He 
noted that diversion programs that include restitution 
would reduce prison overcrowding; this would facilitate 
the detention of more severe criminals. Reduction of 
overcrowding would provide a better therapeutic milieu 
for treating psychopaths and other serious offenders 
(Megaree, 1982; Weinstock, 1990). 
Milieu Therapy for Severe Criminals 
McCord ( 1982) noted son· 0 :0ue;cess in treating 
antisocial personality with rr.i.1.L:u therapy. Reid 
described the interpersonal emphasis in milieu therapy. 
"Great emphasis is placed on the individual's 
responsibility for himself and others in the program" 
(1986, p. 257). 
Relatedly, Umbreit (1985) noted that the 
offender's sense of personal responsibility is 
increased in programs that require restitution. The 
psychological theories of criminality discussed above 
describe the criminal's evasion of moral 
responsibility. This linkage suggests 
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restitution/response cost studies as a possible line of 
future research.42 
The Superiority of Response Cost to Punishment 
Karl Menninger (1968) described the retributive, 
punishment-oriented penal system as criminal. The 
prcblerns with this view have already been noted: 
compulsory psychotherapy by "official straighteners• 
~ay be more cruel than traditional punishment. 
A softer reading of Menninger is instructive. 
Punishment rr.ay work. Punisr:..'T!ent r:la.Y reflect the 
concept of desert: a.nd free moral agency. Ho:<1ever, 
punish.'T!ent (especially demeaning punishment) rr.ay have 
negative side effects that cannot be ignored (Skinner, 
1965). 
Ramsay Clark (1970) and others may have overstated 
the view that prisons only serve to embitter in.-nates. 
Still, inmates do report being bitter.43 
42 Justice Fellowship (1989) reported that reparative sanctions 
reduce recidivism. Diversionary programs may have a built-in 
selection bias, however. They generally do not choose severe or 
repeat offenders. 
43 Personal observation. 
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Current penological paradigms do not allow inmates 
to pay back any fine to their victims. Making license 
plates for the state (which they have offended under 
American law) does nothing to right the wrong to the 
victims. Fyodor Dostoyevski, an ex-prisoner from 
Siberia and author on crime, testified: "If one wanted 
to crush, to annihilate a man utterly, to inflict on 
him the most terrible of punishments . . one need 
only give him work of an absolutely, completely useless 
and irrational character• (Colson, 1990, pp. 197-198). 
Reid expects inmate/patients to improve in therapy 
if they can overcome their responsibility avoidance 
{Reid, 1986) . Penal programs that included a response 
cost element would restore the inmate's sense of 
dignity. Criminals could be required to pay for their 
incarceration as well as pay restitution to victims 
(Justice Fellowship, 1989). This would restore the 
peace {shalom) and reconcile them to their victims. 
The restoration of shalom may make psychotherapy 
possible. 
Moral Education 
Moral development is a valid domain of study for 
psychologists. The most common subject in moral 
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development research is the acquisition of moral 
reasoning ability in children (Edelman & Goldstein, 
1982; Gibbs & Basinger, 1992; Kohlberg, 1981). Stunted 
moral development is implicit in the thecries of severe 
criminality surveyed above. Criminals lie, steal, and 
kill. 
Moralizing or preaching at severe criminals is not 
likely to be successful. However, some form of moral 
education may make psychotherapy possible. Criminals 
taught the existence of universal standards, empathy, 
and responsibility may respond. Most moral development 
research is done on norrnal, growing children (Gibbs & 
Basinger, 1992). W"~ether Kohlberg's cognitive-moral 
theory applies to remediating offenders is unknown. 
Kegan (1986) believed so. He postulated that p~rt 
of the core of psychopathy is a moral-developmental 
arrest. He saw psychopaths as fixated at Kohlberg's 
instru.~ental level of moral functioning (i.e., stage 2) 
(see Table 17). 
Table 17 
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A Brief Description of Kohlberg's Coanitive-Moral 
Developmental Stages 









Sta e 6 
Stage Orientations 
Punishment and Obedience 
Instrumental Relativist 
Interpersonal Concordance 
Law and Order 
Social Contract/Legalise 
Universal Ethical-Princiole 
Some prison programs teach a values-clarification 
approach to inmates (Elem, 1990) . Edelman and 
Goldstein (1982) noted that values clarification is 
based on the untenable assumption that values are 
relative. 44 The notion of values-relativity may appeal 
to the morally-arrested psychopath all too well. 
Other, more robust methods of moral education may be in 
44 However, values-clarification exercises may have benefits, 
especially for the morally mature {H. Lewis, 1990). 
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order, however (Edelman & Goldstein, 1982). Didactic 
character education programs may be more appropriate 
for criminal populations. 
Character education need not eq~al indoctrination. 
Edelman and Goldstein defined indoctrination as •the 
teaching of certain values, attitudes, or beliefs 
without due regard to thoughtful reflection and direct, 
open inquiry and discussion concerning their 
reasonableness a.~d worth in light of other, alternative 
values or beliefs" (1982, p. 260). As an example of 
moral education ~ithouc indoctrinat~on, they cited the 
Character Ed:Jca.t.iqn 0.irr;icµ.l:l.h'n, which attempts to shew 
the reasonableness and utility of traditional val~es 
(1982). Relatedly, Etzioni (19931 and Bellah (1991) 
advocated the teaching of prosocial co~rr~nity values in 
order to halt American moral decline. These moral 
virtues could be. taught to criminals as well. Teaching 
them to "at risk" predelinquents may be even better. 
The link between arrested moral development in 
severe criminals and psychotherapy needs to be 
addressed by empirical research. Also, teaching moral 
values to the antisocially disordered may make them 
more amenable to therapy. 
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Recognition of Evil: The Foundation of a Restorative 
Forensic Psychology 
Both the general public and practicing 
psychologists are pessimistic about rehabilitating 
severe criminals. Strictly speaking, criminals need to 
be habilitated, not rehabilitated. 
The Christian view of real evil illuminates the 
importance of this task. Human beings are not 
naturally good. Left to themselves without moral 
education or responsibility acquisition, they will 
remain in a selfish, morally bankrupt homeostasis. 
Psychologists who wish to practice ethically will 
not allow their services to be meted out as punishment. 
The distinction between professional psychological 
services and punishment can only be retained if social 
penalty is kept separate from psychotherapy. The 
Christian view of the dignity and responsibility of 
humanity makes this view tenable and saves 
psychological ethics. 
Restorative justice is a biblical concept. It 
serves a psychological function by restoring the peace 
(shalom) and the sense of personal responsibility that 
makes psychotherapy possible. 
Crime and Evil 
137 
The moral development of of fenders needs to be 
studied further. The development of 'moral sensitivity 
may also :r.ake psychopaths and other severe criminals 
amenable to therapy. Primary and secondary prevention 
programs could be designed to help morally stunted 
youth as well. 
The recognition of real evil in hurnan nature 
facilitates the practice of forensic psychology. 
Therapeutic nihilism may be a premature conclusion. To 
move beyond the "nothing works" malaise that hangs over 
forensic psychology may be possible by adopti::.g 
approaches to psychotherapy that directly address 
morality and personal responsibility in severe 
criminals. 
CHAPTER 5 
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SUMM.~.RY, SUGGESTIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
A Recapitulation of Results 
In Plato's dialogue Gorqias (1990). Socrates 
argued that ignoring evil is worse than evil itself. 
He contended that the application of justice overcomes 
evil in the same way that the application of medicine 
overcomes illness. 
Socrates also observed that criminals seek to 
avoid responsibility and think that avoidance will make 
them happy. It actually makes them "the most miserable 
of all men" (Plato, 1990, p. 270), because criminals 
are moral agents, men and women created in the image of 
God. 
Restorative justice was advanced as a model on 
which to construct a forensic psychology. Directly 
addressing the issues of responsibility avoidance and 
moral fixation may make successful psychotherapy 
possible. Acknowledging evil and making restitution (a 
response cost) for it can make real growth possible. 
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Ignoring evil blocks therapeutic growth. The 
whole community suffers as well when the peace (shalom) 
is disturbed. 
This restorative forensic psychology was based on 
an examination of human nature. Shneidman's paradigm 
was used to argue that criminality is a quasi-
psychological construct. Criminal behavior, like 
suicidal behavior, does not fit into one diagnostic 
box. Therefore crime ought not be studied parochially. 
Philosophical, sociological, theological, and other 
perspectives should be examined as well. This 
methodology better accounts for hUI!'an natur8 and 
effectively integrates into forensic psychology t~e 
common-sense attribution that severe criminality is 
evil. 
Special treatment was given to criminality as it 
is currently conceived by major forensic theorists. 
Antisocial Personality Disorder and the criminal 
personality were discussed. The psychopathy construct 
as const:::ued by psychoanalytic theorists and by Hare 
was reviewed. Inherent in these theories is the 
judgment that certain behavior is wrong or evil. 
A discussion of psychological cause and effect 
focused on the Aristotelian and Hippocratic views and 
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showed that the idea of cause is not as simple as it 
seems. Divine and human agency are not contradictory. 
Also, causes may function as predispositions or 
excitations; from this psychology and medicine have 
derived the notion of diathesis and stress. 
This means that everyone is predisposed to certain 
conditions or behaviors, criminality included. Being 
predisposed (the material cause) alone never means 
predestination. The idea of psychological well-being 
presupposes a design plan, or formal cause of behavior 
which is theoretically attainable. Personal choice or 
agency is always a factor in criminality. Finally, the 
notion of purpose, or teleology, implies a final cause. 
Most importantly, moral agents are not objects. 
They are subjects who are the efficient causes of their 
behavior. Therefore, would-be criminals are not 
determined by their immature object relations (Meloy, 
1988). Their criminal personality may be rigid, but it 
is not permanently fixed (Samenow, 1984). 
Criminals were designed for something better, that 
is to image their Creator. They are fallen, but they 
still have a conscience to give them feedback. As Kant 
(1990) argued, not even psychopaths can have no 
conscience: they have only deconditioned it. 
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The fall was into real evil. Katz (1988) 
documented a real gangland temptation to be "bad." 
Staub (1989) could not explain Nazi criminality without 
recourse to traditional, Judea-Christian beliefs about 
evil. 
Evolutionary views do a poor job of describing 
evil. In such theories, evil is seen as a necessary 
byproduct of progress. These views would be irrational 
to believe even if they were correct. This is because 
evolution-derived views undermine the concept of 
rationality. 
Augustine's (1990) vie'.~ is better and in keeping 
with common-sense observation. Real evil is the result 
of real huroan actio~s. It is pervasive: real evil 
corrupts every person. Evil was shewn to be a quality 
that exists in different quantities in every person. 
Therefore, Augustine's doctrine of total depravity was 
retained. 
This analysis of human nature was rooted in the 
meta-theoretical discussion of the philosophy of 
science. The view of science developed made the 
inquiry into the crime/evil construct possible. 
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keeping with other uses of the scientific method. 
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Psychology, theology, and the other sciences make 
use of idiographic and nomothetic methods. The 
scientific disciplines, psychology and theology 
included, need to adopt a value-critical stance. The 
fact-value dichotomy is false and misleading. 
In psychology, as in all sciences, theories are 
undetermined by the facts. Theory-building is value-
laden; it contains a tacit dimension. Scientism, not 
science, expects a neutral process to describe the sum 
total of reality. In fact, scientific work in the 
natural and human sciences requires hermeneutics. 
Thus, all facts are interpra-facts because facts are 
mute and cannot speak for themselves. 
The view that all human activity is religious, 
including scientific activity, was maintained. Wnen 
this is combined with the conclusion that evil is 
pervasive in every person, criminal and investigator 
alike, that scientists are prone to avoid examining 
evil is no wonder. 
The idea of the unity of all truth, psychological, 
theological, criminological, and so forth, was 
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advanced. The notion that all truth is God's truth 
wherever it may be found was argued. Theism actually 
rules out dogmatism because no science is the queen of 
the sciences. Scientists are equal partners in the 
truth-gathering process. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
Therapies that directly confront the evil behavior 
of forensic patients could be devised and tested 
against traditional therapies. The PCL and criteria 
for APD could be used for screening and assignment 
purposes. 
Orling's Cognitive-Style Questionnaire, an 
instrument with good validity and reliability, could be 
used as an outcome measure (Thaler, 1991). The Exner 
(1990) method and Gacono, Meloy, and Heaven's (1990) 
criteria could be combined to score the Rorschach. 
There is theoretical warrant to use measures of moral 
development and spiritual well-being as well (Ellison, 
1983; Gibbs & Basinger, 1992). 
Prison therapy programs that include restorative 
justice components could be tested against traditional 
corrections. The sa~e outcome measures, as well as 
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recidivism rates, could be analyzed. However, the same 
caveats that apply to recidivism studies in general 
would apply. Also, large-scale changes in correctional 
policy require legislative mandate and financing. 
Spending money on prison programs is not usually a 
fiscal priority. 
A more cost-effective method may be to study 
convicts in community-based restitution programs. They 
could be compared to other offenders in the community, 
such as those on parole and under electronic house 
arrest. 
Churches have traditionally provided the type of 
social support that encourages reintegration into the 
community (i.e., the restoration of shalom) (Bufford & 
Johnson, 1982). Church and community-based Victim-
Offender Reconciliation Programs (V.O.R.P.) and their 
participants need further study (Colson & Van Ness, 
1989). Confi.t1lling real psychological changes in 
offenders could validate these cost-effective programs. 
Further, in a more general way, the crime and evil 
construct could be applied to other psychological 
dysfunctions. The recognition of the role of evil in 
other psychopathology should make for a more 
scientifically rigorous abnormal psychology. 
Conclusion 
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The conunon-sense attribution that severe 
criminality is both evil and psychopathological is 
vindicated by this study. Evil is a real phenomenon. 
A psychological theory that arbitrarily disregards evil 
a priori is prejudicially excluding data that explain 
hu.rnan behavior. 
Cri~inals are difficult to treat psychologically. 
They are unlikely to change because a core factor in 
criminality appears to b~ an unwillingness to change. 
This unwillingness could also be called unrepentance. 
The "nothing works" pessim~sm in forensic 
treatment is premature, however. Until forensic 
psychological theories attend to the whole data set .of 
human behavior, not everything has even been tried. 
Therapies that deal with the psychodynamics, 
cognitive-style, habits, and object relations of severe 
criminals need to be amalganiated with a recognition of 
the evil criminals do. Psychopathy has been called an 
ethical disorder (Mullen, 1992) . Severe criminals need 
moral/ethical therapy. 
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The recognition of real evil will have real 
ramifications in therapy. Safety will be a concern. 
Countertransference will certainly be an issue, and not 
just for psychodynamic therapists. Firm limits will 
need to be set. 
Patients with other mental health diagnoses resist 
psychological healing (Kernberg, 1984; Yalom, 1990). 
This problem is worse with severe criminal clients. 
Not only will they resist you, many will try to 
manipulate you. Some will threaten to kill you. 
The therapist and patient have a common factor, 
however. Both have experienced the temptation to do 
evil. Real evil, a human universal, makes real empathy 
possible. 
The universality of evil makes therapists and 
criminals into co-conspirators and accomplices. This 
makes therapy with a difficult population worthwhile 
and interesting because it teaches us about life and 
about ourselves. 
References 
Crime and Evil 
147 
Abrahamsen, D. (1985). Confessions of son of Sam. 
New York: Colurrbia. 
Adams, J. (1970). Comoetent to counsel. Grand 
Rapids: Baker. 
Adler, M. J. (1990a). ~- In M. J. Adler (Ed.), 
The syntogicon; An index to the crreat ideas (2nd 
ed., Vol. 1, pp. 120-137). Chicago: Encyclopaedia 
Britannica. 
Adler, M. J. 
gl11rality of rel:i.aions and t:he unity of truth: .:ii • .n 
essay in the ghilQ..soohv of religion. New York; 
Collier. 
Alibert, J. L. (1806). Eloqes histoiriques. comooses 
pour la societe medicale de Paris, suivis d'un 
discours sur les rapports de la medecine avec les 
sciences ohysiques et morales [A laudatory account, 
composed for the Medical Society of Paris, following 
a discourse on the relationship of medicine with the 
physical and moral sciences]. Paris; Caille et 
Ravier. 
Crime and Evil 
148 
Allport, G. (1950). The individual and his relioion. 
New York: ~.acmillan. 
Alsford, S. E. (1991). Evil in the nonhuman world. 
Science and Christian Belief, 1. 119-130. 
A!l1erican Heritage Dictionary (3rd ed.). (1992). 
Boston: Houghton and Mifflin. 
American Psychiatric Association. (1952). piagnostic 
and statistical manual of mental disorders. 
Washingtcn, DC: Author. 
American Psychiatric Association. (1987). Diagnostic 
and statistical manual of mental disorders (3rd ed., 
rev.). Washington, DC: Author. 
American Psychiatric Association. (1990). PSM-IY 
update. Washington, DC: Author. 
American Psychological Association. (1974). Casebook 
on ethical standards of psychologists. Washington, 
DC: Author. 
American Psychological Association. (1981) . Ethical 
principles of psvcholooists. Washington, DC: 
Author. 
Anselm. (1969). The ontological proof of St. Anselm, 
from Proslogium. In R. P. Wolff '.:d.), Ten great 
works of ohilosophy (pp. 99-101). New York: Nal 
Penguin. 
Crime and Evil 
149 
Apel, K. o. (1967). Analytic philosophy of lancruacre 
and the qeisteswissenschaften {H. Holstelilie, 
Trans.). Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 
Aquinas, T. (1990). Summa theologica. In M. J. Adler 
(Ed.), Great books of the western world {2nd ed., 
Vol. 17, pp. 1-826). Chicago: Encyclopaedia 
Britannica. 
Archer, G. L. (1975). Crimes and punishments. In M. 
C. Tenney {Ed.), The Zondervan oictorial 
encyclopedia of the Bible {Vol. 1, pp. 1030-1036). 
Grand Rapids: Zondervan. 
Aristotle. {1990a). Nichor.i.achean ethics. In M. J. 
Adler {Ed.), Great books o~ the western world (2nd 
ed., Vol. 8, pp. 97-137). Chicago: Encyclopa.edia 
Britannica. 
Aristotle. (1990b). Posterior analytics. In M. J. 
Adler (Ed.}, Great books of the western world (2nd 
ed., Vol. 7, pp. 339-436). Chicago: Encyclopaedia 
Britannica. 
Arndt, W. F., & Gingrich, F. W. (1957). A Greek-
English lexicon of the New Testament and other earlv 
Christian literature. Chicago: University of 
Chicago. 
Crime and Evil 
150 
Augustine. (1958). The city of God (V. J. Bourke, 
Ed.). New York: Image Books. 
Augustine. (1990). On Christian doctrine. In M. J. 
Adler (Ed.) & J. F. Shaw (Trans.), Great books of 
the western world (2nd ed., Vol. 16, pp. 697-784). 
Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
Bacon, F. (1990a). Advancement of learning. In M. J. 
Adler (Ed.), Great books of the western world (2nd 
ed., Vol. 28, pp. 1·101). Chicago: Encyclopaedia 
Britannica. (Original work published 1605) 
Bacon, F. (1990b). Novum organum. In M. J. Adler 
(Ed.), Great books of the western world (2nd ed., 
Vol. 28, pp. 105-195). Chicago: Encyclopaedia 
Britannica. (Original work published 1620) 
Barnett, A., Blumstein, A., Cohen, J., & Farrington, D. 
P. (1992). Not all criminal career models are 
equally valid. Criminology, ~. 133-140. 
Barth, K. (1962). Church dogmatics (G. W. Bromiley, 
Trans., Vol. 1). New York: Harper Torchbooks. 
Bellah, R. N. (1991). The good society. New York: 
Knopf. 
Berger, P. (1969). A rumor of anqels: Modern society 
and the rediscovery of the suoernatural. Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday. 
Crime and Evil 
151 
Bergin, A. E. (1981). Psychotherapy and religious 
values. The Journal Qf Clinical and Consulting 
Psychology, :la, 95-105. 
Bergin, A. E. (1987). Values and psychotherapy. In 
D. G. Benner (Ed.), Psychothera~y in Christian 
perspective. Grand Rapids: Baker. 
Bergson, H. (1913). Creative evolution {A. Mitchell, 
Trans.). New York: H. Holt. {Original work 
published 1911) 
Black, H. c. (1991). Black's law dictionary. St. 
Paul, MN: West. 
Bloesch, D. G. (1992). A theology of "-ill.rd and spirit: 
a~thoritv and method in_J;_.'lg,Qloav. Do~mers Grove, 
IL: IncerVarsity Press. 
Bonhoeffer, D. (1971). r,etters and oaners from prison 
(E. Bethge, Ed.). New York: Macmillan. 
Boring, E. G. (1957). A historv of exoerimental 
psychology {2nd ed.). New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts. 
Brown, F., Driver, S. R., & Briggs, C. A. (1979). 
Hebrew lexicon (J. Green, Ed.). Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson. 
Crime and Evil 
152 
Bruce, F. F. (1984). Tbe epistles to the Colossians. 
to Philemon. and to the Ephesians (F. F. Bruce, 
Ed.). Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 
Brunner, E. (1950). The Christian doctrine of God (0. 
Wyon, Trans.). Philadelphia: Westminster. 
Bufford, R. K., & Johnson, T. B. (1982). The church 
and community metal health: Unrealized potential. 
Tbe Journal of Psychology and Theology, l..Q., 355-362. 
Bultmann, R. (1958) . Jesus Christ and mythology. New 
York: Charles Scribner & Sons. 
Burtt, E. A. (Ed.). (1939). The English philosophers 
from Bacon to Mill. New York: The Modern Library. 
Calvin, J. (1990). Institutes of the Christian 
religion. In M. J. Adler (Ed.) & H. Beveridge 
(Trans.), Great books of the western world (2nd ed., 
Vol. 20). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
(Original work published 1536) 
Carter, J. D., & Narramore, B. (1979). ~ 
integration of psychology and theology; An 
introduction. Grand Rapids: Zondervan. 
Cicero, M. T. (1986). Cicero on oratory and orators. 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University. 
Clark, G. H. (1957). Thales to Dewey: A history of 
philosoohy. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. 
Crime and Evil 
153 
Clark, G. H. (1964). The nature of the physical 
universe. In C. F. H. Henry (Ed.), Christian faith 
and mcdern theology (pp. 129-143). New York: 
Channel. 
Clark, R. (1970). Crime in ~r.terica. New York: Simon 
& Schuster. 
Cleckley, H. (1941). The mask of sanity; An attempt 
to interpret the so-called psychopathic personalitv. 
St. Louis, MO: Mosby. 
Cleckley, H. (1976). The mask of sanity (5th ed.). 
St. Louis, ~O: Mosby. 
Coleman, J. C., Butcher, J.M., & Ca:::-son, R. C. 
(1984). Abngrmal ps~·chol9gv and modern life. Palo 
Alto, CA: Scott, Foresman & Company. 
Colson, C. (1990). The God of stones and spiders: 
Letters to a church in exile. Wheaton, IL: 
Crossway. 
Colson, C., & Van Ness, D. (1989). Convicted: New 
hooe for ending Affierica's crime crisis. 
Westchester, IL: Crossway Books. 
Conn, H. M. (1988). Normativity, relevance, and 
relativism. In H. M. Conn (Ed.), Inerrancv and 
hermeneutic: A tradition. a challenae. a debate (pp. 
185-209). Grand Rapids: Baker. 
Crime and Evil 
154 
Cooper, J. W. (1989). Body. soul and life 
everlasting; Biblical anthropology and the monism-
dualism debate. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 
Copleston, F. (1985). A historv of philosoohy (Vol. 
3). New York: Image. 
Cosgrove, M. P., & Mallory, J. D. (1977). Mental 
health: A Christian approach. Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan/Probe. 
Darwin, C. (1990) . 
natural selection. 
The origin of species by means of 
In M. J. Adler (Ed.),~ 
books of the western world (2nd ed., Vol. 49, pp. v-
251) . Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. (Original 
work published 1859) 
de Chardin, T. (1975). The phenomenon of man. New 
York: Harper & Row. 
Deering's California penal code. (1985). San 
Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney. 
Descartes, R. (1990). Meditations on first 
philosophy. In M. J. Adler (Ed.), Great books of 
the western world (2nd ed., Vol. 28, pp. 295-329). 
Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. (Original work 
published 1644) 
Diiulio, J. J. (1991). No escape: The future of 
8merican corrections. New York: Basic Books. 
Crime and Evil 
155 
Dilthey, W. (1989). Introduction to the human 
sciences (R. Makkreel & F. Rodi, Eds.). Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton Universi~y Press. 
Dobson, J. C. (1989). Fatal addiction: Ted Bundy's 
~ interview (Film] . Pomona, CA: Focus on the 
Family. 
Dooyeweerd, H. (1980) . In the twilioht of western 
thouohti Studies in the preten~ed autonomy of 
philosoohical thought. Nutley, NJ: Craig. 
(Original work published 1960) 
Dryden, W., & Ellis, A. (1938). Rational-emotive 
therapy. In K. s. Dobson (Ed.), Handbook of 
ccgnitive-behaviQraJ. t~&~2ies (pp. 214-272). New 
York: Guilford. 
Durant, W. (1961). The story of philosonhy. New 
York: Washington Square Press. 
Eccles, J. (1984a). Modern biology and the turn to 
belief in God. In R. A. Varghese (Ed.). 11!.g 
intellectuals speak out about God (pp. 47-50). 
Chicago: Regnery Gateway. 
Eccles, J. (l984bl. The wonder of being human: Our 
brain and our mind. New York: Free Press. 
Crime and Evil 
156 
Edelman, E. M., & Goldstein, A. P. (1982). Moral 
education. In A. P. Goldstein (Ed.}, In response to 
aggression: Methods of control and prosocial 
alternatives (pp. 253-315). New York: Pergamon 
Press. 
Edwards, J. (1992). Sermons and discourses (W. 
Kimnach, Ed.). New Haven, CN: Yale. 
Einstein, A. (1990). Relativity: The special and 
general theory. In M. J. Adler (Ed.), Great books 
of the western world (2nd ed., Vol. 56, pp. 193-
243). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. (Original 
work published 1916) 
Elem, G. (1990). values Clarification. Unpublished 
manuscript, California Men's Colony, San Luis 
Obispo, CA. 
Elizur, J., & Minuchin, S. (1989). Institutionalizing 
madness: Families, therapy and society. New York: 
Basic. 
Ellis, A. (1981). Psychotherapy and atheistic values: 
A response to A. E. Bergin's psychotherapy and 
religious values. The Journal of Clinical and 
Consulting Psychology, 48, 635-639. 
Crime and Evil 
157 
Ellison, c. W. (1983). Spiritual well-being: 
Conceptualization and measurement. Journal of 
Psychology and Theology, 11, 330-340. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. (1992). Crime. In R. 
McHenry (Ed.), Encyclopaedia Britannica (15th ed., 
Vol. 3, p. 736). Chicago: University of Chicago. 
Erickson, M. J. (1985). Christian theology. Grand 
Rapids: Baker. 
Erickson, M. J. (1991). The word became flesh: A 
contemporary inc~rnational christology. Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker. 
Etzioni, A. (1993). The spirit of community. New 
York: Crown. 
Evans, C. S. (1989). Wisdom and humanness in 
psychology: Prosoects for a Christian aocroach. 
Grand Rapids: Baker. 
Exner, J. E. (1990). A Rorschach workbook for the 
comorehensive system (3rd ed.). Asheville, NC: 
Rorschach Workshops. 
Eysenck, H. (1977). Crime and oersonality. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Crime and Evil 
158 
Eysenck, H. (1986) . A critique of contemporary 
classification and diagnosis. In T. Millon & G. L. 
Klerman (Eds.), Contemporarv directions in 
psychopathology; Toward the DSM-IV (pp. 73-98). New 
York: Guilford. 
Eysenck, H.J., & Gudjonsson, G. H. (1989). The 
causes and cures of criminality. New York: Plenum 
Press. 
Feyerabend, P. (1975). Against method; Outline of an 
anarchistic theory of knowledae. London: Hu.'llanities 
Press. 
Feyerabend, P. (1982). Science in a free society. 
Lendon: Verso Press. 
Fingarette, H. (1988). Heavv drinking. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
Flew, A. (Ed.). (1979). A dictionary of philosophv 
(2nd ed., rev.). New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Forth, A. E., Hart, S. D., & Hare, R. D. (1990). 
Assessment of psychopathy in male offenders. 
Psychological Assessment; A Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, ~. 342·344. 
Forward, S. (1989). Toxic parents: Overcoming their 
hurtful legacy and reclaimina your life. New York: 
Bantam Books. 
Crime and Evil 
159 
Freeman, A., & Leaf, R. C. (1989). Cognitive therapy 
applied to personality disorders. In A. Freeman, K. 
Simon, L. Beutler, & H. Arkwitz (Eds.}, The comole~e 
handbook of cognit;ve theraoy (pp. 403-433). New 
York: Plenum. 
Freud, s. (1990). Civilisation and its discontents. 
In M. J. Adler (Ed.), Great books of the western 
~ (2nd ed., Vol. 54, pp. 767-802). Chicago: 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. (Original work published 
1929) 
Freud, s. (1990) . New introductory lectures on 
psycho-analysis. In M. J. Adler (Ed.}, Great books 
of the westen1 world (2nd ed., Vol. 54, pp. 803-
884). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. (Original 
work published 1939) 
Freud, S., & Pfister, O. (1963). Psvchoanalysis and 
~. New York: Basic. 
Friberg, B., & Friberg, T. (Eds.}. (1981). The 
analytical Greek New Testament. Grand Rapids: 
Baker. 
Fromm, E. (1973). The anatomv of hu."na.n 
destructiveness. Greenwich, CT: Fawcett 
Publications. 
Crime and Evil 
160 
Gacono, c. B. (1990). An empirical study of object 
relations and defensive operations in antisocial 
personality disorder. Journal of Personalitv 
Assessment, S,i, 589-592. 
Gacono, c. B., Meloy, J. R., & Heaven, T. R. (1990). 
A Rorschach investigation of narcissism and hysteria 
in antisocial personality. Journal of Personality 
Assessment, ,i5., 270-279. 
Gadamer, H. G. (1982). Reason in the age of science. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Garfield, S., & Bergin, A. (1986). Hand.book of 
psychotherapy and behavior change (3rd ed.). New 
York: Wiley. 
Geisler, N. (1971). Ethics: A1ternatives and issues. 
Grand Rapids: Zondervan. 
Geisler, N. (1976). Christian apoloaetics. Grand 
Rapids: Baker. 
Gerstner, J. H. (1962). The origin and nature of man: 
Ima.go dei. In C. F. Henry (Ed.), Basic Christian 
cioctrines (pp. 89-95) . San Francisco: Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston. 
Gibbs, J. C., & Basinger, K. S. (1992). MQ.12.1 
maturity: Measuring the development of sociomoral 
reflection. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Crime and Evil 
161 
Gingrich, F. w. (1965). Shorter lexicon of New 
Testament Greek. Chicago: University of Chicago. 
Glasser, W. (1965). Reality theraov: A new aooroach 
to psychiatry. New York: Harper & Row. 
Gottfredson, M. R., & Hirschi, T. (Eds.). (1987). 
Positive criminoloav. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Grotstein, J. (1982). Newer perspectives in object 
relations theory. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, ]Ji, 
43-91. 
Gunderson, J. G. (1988). Personality disorders. In 
A. Nicholi (Ed.), Th'Ll.lew Harvard oui~ 
psychiatrv (pp. 337-357). Cambridge, M..l\: Belk.TJ.ap. 
Gundry, R. H. (1987). Srnw! in biblical 1:.heologv: W:!.M 
emphasis on Pauline anthropolQSU. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hall, J. (1945). Criminology. In G. Gurvitch & w. E. 
Moore (Eds.}, Twentieth centurv sociology (pp. 342-
365). New York: Philosophical Library. 
Hamilton, N. G. (1988). The self and others: Object 
relations theory in practice. Northvale, New 
Jersey: Jason Aronson. 
Hamilton, N. G. (1992). From inner sources: New 
directions in object relations psychotherapv. 
Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson. 
Cri:ne and Evil 
162 
Hare, R. D. (1965) . Temporal gradient of fear arousal 
in psychopaths. Journal of A.bnonnal Psychology, 70, 
442-445. 
F.are, R. D. (1966). Psychopathy and choices of 
immediate and delayed punishment. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 1l., 25-29. 
Hare, R. D. (1970). Psychopathy; Theory and research. 
New York: Wiley. 
Hare, R. D. (1980). A research scale for the 
assessment of psychopathy in criminal populations. 
PPrsonality and Individual Differences, i. 111·119. 
Hare, R. D. {1985). Comparison for procedures for the 
assessment of psychopathy. Journal of Clinical and 
Consulting Psychology, .5.J., 7-16. 
Hare, R. D., Hart, S. D., & Harpur, T. J. (1991). 
Psychopathy and the DSM-IV criteria for antisocial 
personality disorder. Journal of Abnonnal 
Psychology, l.QQ, 391-398. 
Hare, R. D., & Jutai, J. (1983). Criminal history of 
the male psychopath: Some preliminary data. In K. 
Van Dusen & S. Mednick (Eds.), Prospective studies 
of crime and delinquencv (pp. 100-103). Boston: 
Kluner Mijhoff Publishing. 
Crime and Evil 
163 
Hare, R. D., & McPherson, L. M. (1984). Violent and 
aggressive behavior by criminal psychopaths. 
International J011rnal of Law and Psychiatry, 1. 34-
50. 
Harnack, A. van. (1958) . What is Christianity? {5th 
ed.). London: E. Benn. {Original work published 
1901) 
Harpur, T. J., Hare, R. D., & ?.akstian, A. R. (1989). 
Two factor conceptualization of psychopathy: 
Construct validity and assessment implications. 
Psychological Assessment: A Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psycholoav, 1 1 o-17. 
Hartmann, H. (1940). ~_g:y_Qll.Q].Qgy ~nd_.t.he problem 
of adaptation. New York: International Universities 
Press. 
Harvey, J. H., & Weary, G. {Eds.). (1985). 
Attribution: Basic issues and applications. 
Orlando, FL: Academic. 
Hegel, G. W. F. (1990). The philosophy of right. In 
M. J. Adler (Ed.), Great books of the western world 
{2nd ed., Vol. 43, pp. 1·154). Chicago: 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. {Original work published 
1821) 
Crime and Evil 
164 
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of inter:personal 
relations. New York: Wiley. 
Heidigger, M. (1968). ~11.at is called thinking. New 
York: Harper & Row. 
Heisenberg, w. (1990). Physics and philosophy. In M. 
J. Adler (Ed.), Great books of the western world 
(2nd ed., Vol. 56, pp. 391-456). Chicago: 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. (Original work published 
1958) 
Hendriksen, W. (1979). New Testament commentary: 
Exposition of I and II Thessalonian§. Grand Rapids: 
Baker. 
Hick, J. (1977). Eyil and the love of God. New York: 
Harper & Row. 
Hippocrates. (1990). Hippocratic writings. In M. J. 
Adler (Ed.), Great books of the western world. (2nd 
ed., Vol. 9, pp. 1-339). Chicago: Encyclopaedia 
Britannica. 
Horgan, J. (1993). Profile: Paul Karl Feyerabend. 
Scientific A.merican, ~. 36-37. 
House, H. W. (1991). In favor of the death penalty. 
In V. Grounds (Ed.), The death penalty debate: Two 
opposing views of capital punishment (pp. 1-104). 
Dallas: Word. 
Crime and Evil 
165 
Hu.~e. D. (1939). An enquiry concerning human 
understanding. In E. Burtt (Ed.), The English 
philosonhers from Bacon to Mill (pp. 598-689). New 
York: Random House. (Original work published 1748) 
Hunt, D. (1987). Beyond seduction. Eugene, OR: 
Harvest House. 
Issler, K. (1993). Conscience: Moral sensitivity and 
moral reasoning. In J. P. Moreland & D. M. Ciocchi 
(Eds.), Christian perspectives on being human (pp. 
263-281). Grand Rapids: Baker. 
James, W. (1990). Principles of psychology. In M. J. 
Adler (Ed.), Great boo~<s Q.f__tbe westPrn worlg (2nd 
ed., Vol. 54, pp. 1-897). Chicago: Encyclopaedia 
Britan.~ica. (Original work published 1390) 
Jastrow, R. (1978). Q.QQ_and the stronomers. New 
York: Warner Books. 
Jewett, R. (1971). Paul's anthropolocrical terms: A 
study of their use in conflict settincrs. Leiden, 
The Netherlands: Brill. 
Johnson. R. (1987). A history of the Jews. New York: 
Harper & Row. 
Johnson, P. E. (1991). Darwin on trial. Washington, 
DC: Regnery Gateway. 
Crime and Evil 
166 
Johnson, P. E. (Speaker). (1993). Darwinism on trial 
(Cassette Recording) . Portland, OR: Western 
Seminary. 
Justice Fellowship. (1989). Restorative justice: 
Tbeory. Washington, DC: Author. 
Y.ant, I. (1969). Prolegomena to any future 
metaphysics. In R. P. Wolff (Ed.), Ten great works 
of philosophy (pp. 296-399). New York: Nal Penguin. 
Kant, I. (1990). Preface and introduction to the 
metaphysical elements of ethics. In M. J. Adler 
(Ed.) & T. K. Abbott (Trans.), Great books of the 
western world (2nd ed., Vol. 39, pp. 363-379). 
Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britari..nica. 
Kaplan, H. I., & Sadock, B. J. (1988). Synopsis of 
psychiatry (5th ed.). Baltimore: Williams & 
Wilkins. 
Karoly, P. (1980). Operant methods. In F. H. Kanfer 
(Ed.), Helpina people change, (pp. 210-247). 
Elmsford, NY: Pergamon. 
Katz, J. (1988). The seduction of crime: Moral and 
sensual attractions of doing evil. New York: Basic. 
Kazdin, A. E. (1989). Behavior modification in 
applied settinas (4th ed.). Pacific Grove, CA: 
Brooks/Cole. 
Crime and Evil 
167 
Kegan, R. (1986) . The child behind the mask: 
Sociopathy as developmental delay. In W. Reid 
{Ed.), Unmasking the osychopath. New York: Norton. 
Kendall, P. C., & Braswell, L. (1993). Cognitive-
behavioral therapy for impulsive children {2nd ed.). 
New York: Guilford. 
Kernberg, 0. (1984). Severe personalitv disorders: 
Psychotherapeutic strategies. New Haven: Yale. 
Klooster, F. (1964). The nature of man. In C. F. 
Henry {Ed.) Christian faith and modern theolocry {pp. 
145-173). New York: Channel. 
Kohlberg, L. (1981) . The meanincr and measurement of 
moral develooment. Worcester, MA: Clark University 
Press. 
Kohut, H. (1971). The analysis of the self. New 
York: International University Press. 
Krabbendarn, H. (1980). B. B. Warfield versus G. C. 
Berkouwer on scripture. In N. Geisler {Ed.), 
Inerrancv (pp. 413-446). Grand Rapids: Zondervan. 
Kuh.~, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific 
revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Crime and Evil 
168 
Laudan, L. (1990) . Science and relativism; Some key 
controversies in the philosophy of science. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lewis, C. S. (1947). Ihe Abolition of man; How 
education develoos man's sense of morality. New 
York: Macmillan. 
Lewis, c. S. (1970a). The humanitarian theory of 
punishment. In W. Hooper (Ed.), Q..od in the dock; 
Essays on theology and ethics (pp. 287-300). Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans. 
Lewis, C. S. (l970b). Th_e problem of oain. New York: 
Macmillan. 
Lewis, C. S. (1978). Miracles. New York: ~.acmillan. 
Lewis, D. (1980). Fear of crime; Incivility and the 
production of a social problem. New Brunswick, NJ; 
Transaction Press. 
Lewis, H. (1990). A question of values; Six wavs we 
make personal choices that shape our li~. New 
York: Harper & Row. 
Liddell, H. G., & Scott, R. (1968). A Greek-English 
lexicon. New York: Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Lombroso, c. (1968). Crime: Its causes and remedies. 
Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith. 
Crime and Evil 
169 
Lowen, A. (1985) . Narcissism; Denial of the true 
~. New York: Collier. 
Luck, U. 
( ,, ( ,,, 
(1972). Uynrr1s, uytatvoo. In G. Brorniley (Ed. 
and Trans.), Theolocrical dictionary of the New 
Testament (pp. 308-313). Grand Rapids: Eerdrna.ns. 
Luther, M. (1958). Cornmenta:i::y on Genesis (J. T. 
Mueller, Trans.). Grand Rapids: Zondervan. 
Martinson, R. (1974). What works--questions and 
answers about prison reform. The Public Interest, 
.lS_, 22-34. 
l-'f..athisen, J. iL (1990). The o:.:-igins of sociology; Why 
no Christian influence? ~~n Scholars Review, 
~. 49-65. 
Mcconaghy, N. (1989). Sexual dysfunction and 
deviation. In A. S. Bellack & M. Hersen (Eds.), 
Behavioral assessment: A practical hand.book (pp. 
490-541). New York: Pergamon. 
McCord, w. (1982). The psychooath and milieu therapv: 
A longitudinal study. New York: Academic Press. 
McCord, W., & McCord, J. (1964). The psvchooath: An 
essay on the criminal mind. Princeton, NJ: Van 
Nostrand. 
Crime and Evil 
170 
Megaree, E. I. (1982). Reflections on psychology in 
the criminal justice system. In J. Gunn & D. P. 
Farrington (Eds.), Abnormal offenders. delinguencv. 
and the criminal justice system (pp. 9-35) . New 
York: Wiley. 
Meloy, J. R. (1988). The psychopathic mind; Origins. 
dynamics. and treatment. Northvale, NJ: Aronson. 
Meloy, J. R. (1992). Violent attachnients. Northvale, 
NJ: Aronson. 
Meloy, J. R., & Gacono, c. (1988). Tbe Rorschach and 
psychopathy. Northvale, NJ: Aronson. 
Menninger, K. (1968). Ihe crime of punishnient. New 
York: Viking. 
Menninger, K. (1973). Whatever became of sin? New 
York: Hawthorne Books. 
Merton, R. (1938). Science, technology and society in 
17th century England. Osiris, ,i, 360-632. 
Meyers, D. G. (1978). 'I'he human puzzle: Psycholooical 
research and Christian belief. San Francisco: 
Harper & Row. 
Mill, J. S. (1843). A system of logic. ratiocinative 
ansi inductive; Beino a connected view of the 
principles of evidence. and methods of scientific 
investigation. London: J. w. Parker. 
Crime and Evil 
171 
Miller, P. W. (1989). Theories of developmental 
~chology (2nd ed.). New York: W. H. Freeman. 
Millon, T. (1985). Personalitv and its disorders. 
New York: Wiley. 
Millon, T. (1986). 
psychopathology. 
Millon, T. (1990). 
York: Wiley. 
Contem9orary directions in 
New York: Guilford. 
Toward a new personology. New 
Millon, T., & Klennan, G. L. (1986). Contemoorary 
directions in psychopatholocry: Toward the DSM-IV. 
New York: Guilford. 
Montagu, A. (1976). :rt~.J;JJ.re of hu.'!lan acrgression. 
New York: Oxford. 
Montgomery, J. W. (1975). The law above the law. 
Minneapolis: Bethany House. 
Moreland, J. P. (1987). Scalincr the secular citv: A 
defense of Christianity. Grand Rapids: Eaker. 
Moreland, J. P. (1989). Christianity and the nature 
of science: A philosophical investigation. Grand 
Rapids: Baker. 
Moreland, J. P. (1993). A defense of a substance 
dualist view of the soul. In J. P. Moreland & D. 
Ciocchi (Eds.), Christian oersoectives on beincr 
~ (pp. 55-79). Grand Rapids: Baker. 
Crime and Evil 
172 
Morris, H. M. (1984). The biblical basis for modern 
~e~. Grand Rapids: Baker. 
MUllen, D. E. (1992). Psychopathy: A developmental 
disorder of ethical actions. Criminal Behavior and 
Mental Health, z, 234-244. 
Newton, I. (1990). Mathematical principles of natural 
philosophy. In M. J. Adler (Ed.), Great books of 
the western world (2nd ed., Vol. 32, pp. 1-372). 
Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. (Original work 
published 1687) 
Niebuhr, R. (1941). Ihe nature and destiny of man: A 
Christian interpretati.Qll. New York: Scribner. 
Nietzsche, F. (1990). Beyond good and evil. In M. J. 
Adler (Ed.), Great books of the western world (2nd 
ed., Vol. 43, pp. 461-545). Chicago: Encyclopaedia 
Britannica. (Original work published 1886) 
Oakes, G. (1988). Weber and Rickert: Concept 
formation in the cultural sciences. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Olinger, E., & Epstein, M. H. 
Crime and Evil 
173 
(1991) . The behavioral 
model and adolescents with behavior disorders: A 
review of selected treatment studies. In M. Hersen, 
R. M. Eisler, & P. M. Miller (Eds.), Progress in 
behavior modification, (Vol. 27, pp. 123-156). 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Orling, R. (1991). The Cognitive-stvle questionnaire. 
Unpublished manuscript, California Men's Colony, San 
Luis Obispo, CA. 
Pagels, E. (1988). Adam. Eve and the serpent. New 
York: Random House. 
Pannenberg, W. (1976). Theology and the nhi.1..9.soohy of 
science (F. McDonagh, Trans.). Philadelphia: 
Westminster. (Original work pt.:blished 1973) 
Pannenberg, W. (1977). Human nature. election and 
history. Philadelphia: Westminster. 
Pannenberg, W. (1990). Metaphysics and the idea of 
~ (P. Clayton, Trans.). Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 
(Original work published 1988) 
Peck, M. S. (1983). People of the lie: The hooe for 
healing hu.rnan evil. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Crime and Evil 
174 
Pinel, P. (1801). Traite medico-philosoohigue sur 
l'alienation mentale. ou manie [A medico-
philosophical treatise on mental derangement and 
mania]. Paris: Richard, Caille et Ravier. 
Plantinga, A. (1983). Reason and belief in God. In 
N. Wolterstcrff & A. Plantinga (Eds.), Faith and 
rationality: Reason and belief in God (pp. 16-93). 
Notre Dame~ University of Notre Dame Press. 
Plantinga, A. (1990). Advice to Christian 
philosopheriS. In M. D. Beatty (Ed.), Christian 
theism and the problems of philosophy. Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Da.~e Press. 
Plantinga, A. {1993a). Warrant and proper function. 
New York: Oxford. 
?lantinga, A. (1993bl. Warrant: The current debate. 
New York: Oxford. 
Plato. (1990). Gorgias. In M. J. Adler {Ed.), ~ 
books of the western world {2nd ed., Vol. 6, pp. 
252-294). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
Poincare, H. (1990). Science and hypothesis. In M. 
J. Adler {Ed.), Great books of the western world 
{2nd ed., Vol. 56, pp. 1-117). Chicago: 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. {Original work published 
1905) 
Crime and Evil 
175 
Polkinghorne, J. (1991). Cross traffic between 
science and theology. Persoectives on Science and 
the Christian Faith, _il, 144-151. 
Popper, K. R. (1963). Conjectures and refutations: 
The growth of scientific knowledae. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Prins, H. (1986). Dangerous behavior. the law, and 
mental disorder. New York: Tavistock. 
Raine, A., & Dunkin, J. (1990). The genetic and 
psychophysiological basis of antisocial behavior: 
Implications for counseling and therapy. Journal of 
CQunseling and De'rel9pment, M1 637-644. 
Reid, T. (1983). Essays on the intellectual powers of 
man. In R. Beanblossom & K. Lehrer (Eds.), Thomas 
Reid's inguirv ano essays (Vol. 6, No. S, pp. 278-
279). Indianapolis: Hackett. 
Reid, w. H. (1986). Antisocial personality. In A. M. 
Cooper, A. J. Francis, & M. H. Sacks (Eds.), 
Psychiatrv: The pers9nality disQrders and neuroses 
(Vol. l, pp. 251-261). New York: Basic. 
Reid, W. H. , Dorr, D . , Walker, J. I . , & Bonner, J . w. 
III (Eds.). (1986). Umnaskina the osychooath. New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Crime and Evil 
176 
Rickert, H. (1986). The limits of concept formation 
in natural science; A logical introduction to the 
historical sciences (G. Oakes, Ed. and Trans.). New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Ricour, P. (1967). Tbe symbolism of evil. New York: 
Harper & Row. 
Rogers, c. (1962). Niebuhr on the nature of man. In 
S. Donniger (Ed.), The nature of man in theoloaical 
and psychological perspective (pp. 55-71) . New 
York: Harper & Brothers. 
Ross, R. R., & Fabiano, E. A. (1985). Time to think: 
A cognitive model of delinquency prevention and 
offender rehabilitation. Johnson City, NJ: 
Institute of Social Sciences and Arts. 
Rush, B. (1972). Iwo essays on the mind. New York: 
Brunner/Mazel. (Original work published 1812) 
Rushdoony, R. J. (1980). Introduction. In H. 
Dooyeweerd (Ed.), In the twiliaht of western 
thouaht: Studies in the pretended autonomy of 
philosophical thought (pp. vii-xvi). Nutley, NJ: 
Craig. (Original work published in 1960) 
Sagan, C. (1988). Introduction. In S. J. Hawking, A 
brief history of time: From the bia bang to black 
~- New York: Bantam. 
Crime and Evil 
177 
Sales, B. D. (1983). The orofessional osychologist's 
hand.book. New York: Plenum. 
Samenow, S. (1984). Inside the criminal mind. New 
York: Times. 
Sandler, J. (1980). Aversion methods. In F. H. 
Kanfer (Ed.), Helping people change (pp. 294-333). 
Elmsford, NY: Perga.~on. 
Sank, D., & Caplan, D. I. (1991). To be a victim 
Encounters with crime and injustice. New York: 
Plenum Press. 
Saucy, R. (1993). Theology of human nature. In J. P. 
Moreland & D. Ciccchi (Eds.), Christian pers?ectives 
en being human (pp. 17-52). Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker. 
Schaeffer, F. A. (l968a). Escane fro~ reason. 
Chicago: Intervarsity. 
Schaeffer, F. A. (1968bl. The God who is there: 
Speaking historic Christianity into the 20th 
century. Chicago: InterVarsity. 
Schleiermacher, F. (1988). On religion: Speeches to 
its cultured despisers (R. Crouter, Trans.). New 
York: Cambridge. (Originally published 17991 
Crime and Evil 
178 
Schrodinger, E. (1990). What is life? In M. J. Adler 
(Ed.), Great books of the western world (2nd ed., 
Vol. 56, pp. 459-504). Chicago: Encyclopaedia 
Britannica. (Original work published 1944) 
Schuster, M. (1987). Power. pathology and paradox: 
The dynamics of good and evil. Grand Rapids, MI: 
Academie. 
Shneidman, E. s. (1993). Suicide as psychache: A 
clinical approach to self-destn;ctive behavior. 
Northvale, NJ.: Aronson. 
Skinner, B. F. (1965). Science and human behavior. 
New York: Free Pr~ss. 
Snoke, D. w. (1991). Toward a unified view of science 
and theology. Perspectives on Science and the 
Christian Faith, i,l, 166-173. 
Sperry, R. W. (1983). Science and moral priority: 
Merging mind. brain. and human values. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Spier, J. M. (1979). An Introduction to Christian 
philosophy (D. H. Freeman, Trans., 2nd ed.). 
Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publishing Company. (Original work published 1954) 
Crime and Evil 
179 
Staub, E. (1989). The roots of evil: The oricrins of 
aenocide and other group violence. New York: 
Cambridge. 
Stein, M. A. 
it right? 
Stone, A. A. 
(1993, April 24). Why can't science get 
Los Ancreles Times, p. A-21. 
(1988) . Psychiatry and the law. In A. 
M. Nicholi (Ed.), The new Harvard guide to 
psychiatry (pp. 797-829). Cambridge, MA: Belknap. 
Strong, A. H. (1899). Systematic theology (6th ed.) 
New York: Armstrong. 
Thaler, N. (1991). The develop~f a cocrnitive 
style questionnaire: The criminal personality test. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, California School 
of Professional Psychology, Fresno, CA. 
Thielicke, H. (1992). Theology. In R. McHenry (Ed.), 
Encyclopaedia Britannica (15th ed., Vol. 28, pp. 
608-611). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
Toch, H., & Adams, K. (1989). The disturbed violent 
offender. New Haven, CN: Yale. 
Umbreit, M. (1985). Crime and reconciliation: 
Creative options for victims and offenders. 
Nashville: Abingdon. 
Van Fraasen, B. C. (1980). The scientific imaae. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Crime and Evil 
180 
Van Leeuwen, M. S. (1985). The person in psycholocry: 
A contemporary Christian appraisal. Grand Rapids: 
Inter-Varsity. 
van Ness, D. w. (1986). Crime and its victims: What 
we can do. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity. 
Walters, G. D. (1990). Tbe Criminal lifestyle; 
Patterns of serious criminal conduct. Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage. 
Walters, G. D., & White, T. W. (1989). Heredity and 
crime: Bad genes or bad research. Criminology, 2..1 
455-488. 
Weinstock, R. (1990) . Antisocial personality 
disorder. In Rosner & Weinstock (Eds.), Ethical 
practice in psvchiatry and the law (pp. 41-59). New 
York: Plenum. 
White, J. (1987). pytting the soul back into 
psychology: When secular values ignore spiritual 
realities. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity. 
White, V. (1961). God and the unconscious. 
Cleveland: Meridian. 
Widiger, T. A., Frances, A. J., Pincus, H. A., Davis, 
W. W., & First, M. (1991). Toward an empirical 
classification for DSM-IV. Journal of Abnormal 
Psvcholoqy, lQQ, 280-288. 
Crime and Evil 
181 
Wilson, A. N. (1990). C. S. Lewis: A bioaraphv. New 
York: Fawcett Columbine. 
Wilson, J. Q., & Herrnstein, R. J. (1985). Crime and 
human nature. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Windelband, W. (1935). A history of philosophy: With 
esoecial reference to the fonnation and develooment 
of its problems and conceptions (2nd ed.). New 
York: Macmillan. (Original work published 1901) 
Winicott, D. w. (1953). Transitional objects and 
transitional phenomena: A study of the first not-me 
possession. International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, .li. 89-97. 
Yalom, I. ( 1990 l . Love' s~ecuticner and other tales 
of psychotherapy. New York: Basic. 
Yochelson, S., & Sa.~enow, S. (1976). The criminal 
personality: Profiles for chancre (Vol. 1). New 
York: Aronson. 
Appendix A 
Glossary of Terms 
Crime and Evil 
182 
Appendix A 
Glossary of Terms 
Crime and Evil 
183 
Archimetiean point: a foundational or 
presuppositional starting point for a theory, based on 
the statement attributed to Archimedes, "give me a 
fixed point (a fulcrum) and I will move the earth." 
classical foµndationalism: the position that one 
is only justified in holding a belief if one has 
sufficient evidence (warrant) for doing so. 
~: a legal clas3ification deter.:nined by 
statute. Criminality is the behavior o: criminals. 
Because most persons (especially males) commit some 
crime in their lives, criminality is usually used as 
denoting only severe criminality (Wilson & Herrnstein, 
1985). Crime rates in ~-~erica are measured with the 
Uniform Crime Report (UCR), which is derived from law 
enforcement reports, and the National Crime Survey 
(NCS), a random survey of victimization. The UCR has 
been criticized for being politically manipulated as it 
is deper.dent on police reports. The NCS responders 
also may underreport domestic violence because the 
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abuser may be present during the survey. It is also 
dependent on victims' memories, especially of when a 
crime happened {a crime that was actually outside the 
survey period may be counted) . 
critical rationalism: the view of science 
associated with Karl Popper that science can only 
falsify but never verify hypotheses. 
criminological psvchology: a term often used 
synonymously with forensic psychology in this 
investigation. Criminological psychology often has the 
connotation of postadjudication consultation. 
empiricism: the view that reality is only known 
by e..""tperience; usually related to the idea that 
induct:ve methods are superior to deductive ones for 
ascertaining truth. 
epistemic warrant and properlv Pasic beliefs: in 
Plantinga's thought, the idea that some beliefs are 
properly basic and that one may be reasonable in 
holding the.~ on the basis of no evidence at all. For 
Plantinga, belief in God exhibits proper basicality. 
This construct does not address the veracity of a truth 
claim, per se, but whether one could be considered 
reasonable for holding to that claim. 
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~: morally wrong; immoral; wicked. This 
dissertation argued that people generally attribute 
evil (as well as pathological) motivations to 
criminals. However, since Nietzsche, the trend has 
been to transcend or go Bevond Good and Evil in western 
thought (1886/1990) . Instead, psychology should revive 
and employ the concept of evil in order to better 
describe criminal behavior. 
forensic psychology: any psychological practice 
done in a forensic !legal) setting. This would include 
any (a) assessrr.ent, triage, and :reatrnent in jails or 
prisons; (bl pre-adjudication determinations of 
custody, competency to stand trial, treatment to 
recover competency (to stand trial, be executed, etc.); 
and (c) determinations of dangerousness, suitability 
for parole or special programs as mandated by statute. 
human sciences: sometimes thought of as a cross 
between the humanities and the hard sciences. As noted 
in chapter 2, the human sciences often describe a 
grouping of the sciences. Other researches write about 
human science methods, (i.e., idiographic methods). 
irrationalism: in the philosophy of science, the 
view that scientific progress is more the result of 
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forces outside of science, such as politics, chance, 
social forces, and so forth, than of rational progress. 
naturalism: the view that only natural 
explanations of phenomena are meaningful; an antonym of 
supernaturalism. 
DQSitivism: the view that metaphysics should be 
avoided in science and that parsimonious laws should be 
the goal of science (Popper, 1963). 
pragmatism: usually refers to an eclectic model 
of the philosophy of science like that of Larry Laudan 
(1990}. The pragmatist has many values in science, and 
these values must be weighted when measuring rival 
theories. 
psycbovathy: a personality construct refined by 
Cleckley; often used as a synonym for sociopathy. Hare 
has operationalized psychopathy with his checklist, the 
Psychopathy Check-List (PCL). Meloy, a psychodynamic 
theorist, has done much to develop the construct. Some 
believe that a psychopathy-like diagnostic label would 
be a more meaningful clinical tool than DSM antisocial 
personality. 
realism: the view that the results and 
conclusions of science correspond exactly to the real 
world. Moreland (1989) acknowledged the antirealist 
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critique and adopted realism or antirealism on a case-
by-case basis. 
scientism: the view explained in chapter 1 that 
inflates science to a status as arbiter of truch. Lay 
advocates of scientism are often uncritically accepting 
of scientific experts and are usually unaware of the 
critique of science. 
supernaturalism: the view that phenomena that 
defy currently accepted laws of nature should not be 
ruled out a priori. Supernaturalism does not imply 
that these phe~omena are co~.mon, however. 
theodicy: the investigation of the problem of 
evil in respect to God's righteousr.ess. Theodicies 
attempt to explain how a good God can allow suffering, 
calamity, and death. 
weltanschauung: world-life-view. The New 
Introducto:r:y Lectures on Psvcho-Analysis provides a 
good definition: "an intellectual construction, which 
gives a unified solution of all the problems of our 
existence in virtue of a comprehensive hypothesis, a 
construction therefore, in which no question is left 
open and in which all we are interested in finds a 
place" (Freud, 1939/1990, p. 874). 
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Technical and Common Usage of Realism and its Opposites 
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ima. es. 
ar.:;! 
tells us about the 
real world. 
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Hare's Psychopathy Check-List 
1. Glibness/Superficial Chann 
2. Grandiose sense of self-worth 
3. Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom 
4. Pathological lying 
5. Conning/Manipulation 
6. Lack of remorse er guilt 
7. Shallow affect 
8. Callous/lack of empathy 
9. Parasitic lifestyle 
10. Poor behavioral controls 
11. Promiscuous sexual behavior 
12. Early behavior problems 
13. Lack of realistic, long-tenn goals 
14. Impulsivity 
15. Irresponsibility 
16. Failure to accept responsibility for own 
actions 
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17. Many short-term marital relationships 
18. Juvenile delinquency 
19. Revocation of conditional release 
20. Criminal versatility 
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Kant's Proof of the Existence of God from Conscience 
The consciousness of an internal tribunal in man 
(before which "his thoughts accuse or excuse one 
another•) is CONSCIENCE. 
Every man has a conscience, and finds himself 
observed by an inward judge which threatens and keeps 
him in awe (reverence combined with fear); and this 
power which watches over the laws within him is not 
something which he himself (arbitrarily) makes, but is 
incorporated in his being. It follows him like his 
shadow, when he thinks to escape. He may indeed 
stupefy himself with pleasures and distractions, but 
cannot avoid now and then coming to himself or awaking, 
and then he at once perceives its awful voice. In his 
utmost depravity, he may, indeed, pay no attention to 
it, but he cannot avoid hearing it. 
Now this original intellectual and (as a 
conception of duty) moral capacity, called conscience, 
has this peculiarity in it, that although its business 
is a business of man with himself, yet he finds himself 
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compelled by his reason to transact it as if at the 
command of another person. For the transaction here is 
the conduct of a trial (causal before a tribunal. But 
tr.at he who is accused by his car.science should be 
conceived as one and the same person with the judge is 
an absurd conception of a judicial court; for then the 
complainant would always lose his case. Therefore, in 
all duties the conscience of the man must regard 
another than himself as the judge of his actions, if it 
is to avoid self-contradiction. Now this other may be 
an actual or a merely ideal person which reason frames 
to itself. Such an idealized person (the authorized 
jt.<C.ge of conscience) must be one who k..'lo;.·s the heart; 
for the tribunal is set up in the inward part of rr~n; 
at the same time he must also be all-obliging, that is, 
must be or be conceived as a person in respect of whom 
all duties are to be regarded as his commands; since 
conscience is the inward judge of all free actions. 
Now, since such a moral being must at the same time 
possess all power (in heaven and earth), since 
otherwise he could not give his commands their proper 
effect (which the office of judge necessarily 
requires), and since such a moral being possessing 
power over all is called GOD, hence conscience must be 
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conceived as the subjective principle of a 
responsibility for one's deeds before God; nay, this 
latter concept is contained (though it be only 
obscurely) in every moral self-consciousness. (Kant, 
1990, p. 379) 
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